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CHAPTER EIGHT 
THE SUPREME COURT AS A VANGUARD 
Six decades passed between the Terrett case and the first ruling 
based on the First Amendment's religion clauses in the Reynolds case. 
Another six decades passed before the Supreme Court began applying these 
clauses specifically to state and local issues. When the Court finally 
did so in 1940, its caseload increased dramatically and its 
interpretation of their provisions underwent a profound change. 
The years from 1940 to 1948 represent a constitutional watershed in 
the relationship between church and state, marking a transition between 
the Court's role as a guardian of the traditional religious values and 
its more active role in the vanguard of a new religious consensus. But 
it is not clear that the Court has led the change so much as it has 
simply articulated some of the political, technological, and cultural 
trends that were already transforming the constitutional system. In 
political as well as religious pronouncements, the customary invocation 
of sacred truths in times past gradually yielded to an apotheosis of an 
increasingly secular pluralism. The Court at most provided a deus ex 
machina for reconciling competing political demands and removing 
sensitive religious issues from the political arena. 
The stage was set for this a renewed judicial activism by the 
Court's incorporation of the religious liberty guarantees of the First 
Amendment into the Fourteenth Amendment protections against state 
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interference. Apart from the expansion of its jurisdiction, it was the 
Court's broader vision of the scope of the religion clauses that most 
characterized the change. But what the definition of religion gained in 
breadth it lost in precision. 
Before 1940, the Court rarely distinguished between the two 
provisions of the First Amendment, which together read: "Congress shall 
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof. " Before 1947, it did not even hint that 
there might be an inherent conflict or incompatibility between them. 
They were treated as a unit. Yet a year later, the Court used the 
establishment clause for the first time as a basis for ruling a law 
unconstitutional. As a consequence, the religious complexion of public 
education soon began to be radically altered. 
Since 1815, the Supreme Court has handed down some 130 separate 
decisions on issues of church and state. Nearly a quarter of these are 
establishment cases involving schools, most of which have been decided 
since 1962. But this series of school cases was preceded by more than 
two dozen free exercise cases involving a single denomination--the 
Jehovah's Witnesses--over a period of roughly two decades from 1937 
through 1955. These cases straddle the transition between the Court's 
custodial and activist periods. They faithfully record the doctrinal 
and personal struggles that marked the change and have typified the 
Court's rulings ever since. 
The Free Exercise Clause 
The free exercise clause was the first of the religion clauses to 
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be adopted specifically into the Court's catalog of rights guaranteed 
under the Fourteenth Amendment. The major portion of the early free 
exercise cases decided under the new rule involved door-to-door 
canvassing and public assemblies. By the 1960s, however, the Court's 
attention had shifted to issues concerning conscientious objection. 
Some of the cases examined in this first section have counterparts 
in the section on the establishment clause. The seven church property 
cases and the two religious test cases could easily be handled in either 
section, but all of them--with the exception of a case involving church 
tax exemptions--are included in the first section. Moreover, parallels 
between the two sets are especially evident in the school cases and the 
Sunday law cases, most of which are included in the establishment 
section. 
For the sake of simplicity and convenience, cases decided after 
1979 are left for the discussion of fiscal, educational, and social 
issues in the chapters that follow. 
Circulars and Solicitors 
The Jehovah's Witnesses pioneered in the wedding of religious 
proselytism to the latest communications technology. Their portable 
phonographs and sound trucks figure in several cases. An offshoot of 
the nineteenth century millenial Adventist movement, the sect had been 
founded by Charles Taze Russell, a Pennsylvania haberdasher, and was at 
that time under the leadership of Judge Joseph Rutherford. 1 Members of 
the sect, all of whom were considered ministers, found themselves 
continually running afoul a battery of municipal police regulations in 
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scattered communities throughout the country. The early Mormon cases 
had been confined to a single region under federal territorial 
jurisdiction, but almost all of the Jehovah's Witnesses cases, by 
contrast, involved state laws and local ordinances. 
The first two times the Court fully considered the issues raised by 
the sect, it made no reference to the religious clauses. In Lovell v. 
City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938), the unanimous Court ruled 
unconstitutional a local ordinance in Georgia prohibiting the 
distribution of circulars within city limits without the permission of 
the city manager. But in a similar case that raised only a free 
exercise issue, Coleman v. City of Griffin, 302 U.S. 636 (1937), the 
Court had dismissed the appeal for want of a substantial federal 
question because it raised only a free exercise issue. The Lovell case 
was instead based on the First Amendment guarantees of freedom of speech 
and press, which had already been incorporated into the Fourteenth 
Amendment protections. Referring to John Milton's famous "Appeal for 
the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing,'' Chief Justice Hughes noted that 
"liberty of the press became initially a right to publish 'without a 
license what formerly could be published only with one'" (303 U.S. 444, 
451). 
A year later, in Schneider v. New Jersey (Town of Irvington), 308 
U.S. 147 (1939), the Court overturned on the same basis a similar 
ordinance requiring canvassers to obtain a permit from the chief of 
police, holding that the authority to prevent littering could not be 
used to suppress the circulation of handbills. Although frauds may be 
punished and trespasses forbidden, it declared that a municipality may 
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not entrust to a police officer the discretionary power "to determine, 
as a censor, what literature may be distributed from house to house and 
who may distribute it" (308 U.S. 147, 163). 
Similar issues were later taken up in Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 
413 (1943), which concerned the right to appeal a $5.00 fine for 
violating a Dallas city ordinance against the distribution of handbills, 
and Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418 (1943), which involved an ordinance 
requiring a thorough investigation before the mayor of Paris could issue 
a permit to solicitors. But both of these cases were decided after the 
religious clauses were adopted and applied through the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
In the meantime, the ~ourt had begun to chart its new course in 
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). This time a ruling on 
religious grounds was unavoidable because the statute in question 
empowered the secretary of the public welfare council to determine 
whether a particular cause or appeal represented by solicitors was a 
religious one. Newton Cantwell and his two sons were convicted of 
violating the statute after they went singly from house to house, 
inviting the occupants to listen to phonograph records that described 
the books they were selling, and soliciting contributions for pamphlets. 
In a separate complaint, two residents of the mostly Catholic 
neighborhood claimed that they were tempted to strike Jesse Cantwell, 
one of the sons, after he played a record entitled "Enemies," which 
attacked their religion and church. 
The state insisted that the law in question "merely safeguards 
against the perpetration of frauds under the cloak of religion." But 
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the appellants believed that "to require them to obtain a certificate as 
a condition of soliciting support for their views amounts to a prior 
restraint on the exercise of their religion within the meaning of the 
Constitution" (310 U.S. 296, 304). The unanimous Court held that the 
Fourteenth Amendment rendered the states just as incompetent as Congress 
to make a law "respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting 
the free exercise thereof." Justice Roberts wrote: 
The constitutional inhibition of legislation on the subject of 
religion has a double aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls 
compulsion by law of any creed or the practice of any form of 
worship. Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such 
religious organization or form of worship as the individual may 
choose cannot be restricted by law. On the other hand, it 
safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion. Thus 
the Amendment embraces two concepts,--freedom to believe and 
freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of 
things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to 
regulation for the protection of society. The freedom to act must 
have appropriate definition to preserve the enforcement of that 
protection. In every case the power to regulate must be so 
exercised as not, in attaining a permissible end, unduly to 
infringe the protected freedom (310 U.S. 296, 303-04). 
The Court also reversed the conviction of Jesse Cantwell for breach 
of peace, a charge that the Court characterized as "a common law concept 
of the most general and undefined nature." Nevertheless, the Court 
granted that there are limits to the exercise of constitutional 
liberties: 
Resort to ep~thets or personal abuse is not in any proper sense 
communication of information or opinion safeguarded by the 
Constitution, and its punishment as a criminal act would raise no 
question under that instrument .... 
The danger in these times from the coercive activities of those who 
in the delusion of racial or religious conceit would incite 
violence and breaches of the peace in order to deprive others of 
their equal right to the execise of their liberties, is emphasized 
by events familiar to all. These and other transgressions of those 
limits the states may appropriately punish (310 U.S. 296, 309-10). 
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In Jones v. City of Opelika, 316 U.S. 584 (1942), the Court upheld 
the convictions of Jehovah's Witnesses for violating ordinances in three 
cities that required a license and the payment of a license tax in order 
to sell books or pamphlets within the municipal limits. Justice 
Stanley Reed wrote for the majority: "The sole constitutional question 
considered is whether a nondiscriminatory license fee, presumably 
appropriate in amount, may be imposed upon these activities" (316 U.S. 
584, 592-93). On a split of five to four, the Court indicated that the 
fees in question would not raise a religious liberty question unless 
they created a substantial burden. "It is prohibition and unjustifiable 
abridgement which is interdicted, not taxation'' (316 U.S. 584, 597). 
Chief Justice Stone dissented, however, and maintained that this 
was taxation disguised as regulation. In no case did the cities make 
the slightest pretense that the fees were assessed to defray the 
expenses of the licensing system: 
Here the licenses are not regulatory, save as the licenses 
conditioned upon payment of the tax may serve to restrain or 
suppress publication. None of the ordinances, if complied with, 
purports to or could control the time, place or manner of the 
distribution of the books and pamphlets concerned. None has any 
discernible relationship to the police protection or the good order 
of the community (316 U.S. 584, 605-06). 
He further contended that the activity in question lacked commercial 
elements that, apart from the exercise of freedom of speech and 
religion, might afford a basis for taxation. But the real issue, he 
believed, was the taxation of a liberty protected by the Bill of Rights. 
"No one could doubt that taxation which may be freely laid upon 
activities not within the protection of the Bill of Rights could--when 
applied to the dissemination of ideas--be made the ready instrument for 
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destruction of that right" (316 U.S. 584, 607). 
The immunity which press and religion enjoy may be lost when they 
are united with other activities not immune. Valentine v. 
Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 62 S.Ct. 920, 86 L.Ed. --. But here the 
only activities involved are the dissemination of ideas, 
educational and religious, and the collection of funds for the 
propagation of those ideas, which we have said is likewise the 
subject of constitutional protection (316 U.S. 584, 608). 
The Chief Justice also believed that First Amendment freedoms are 
immune from taxation because of their "preferred position:" 
The First Amendment is not confined to safeguarding freedom of 
speech and freedom of religion against discriminatory attempts to 
wipe them out. On the contrary the Constitution, by virtue of the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments, has put those freedoms in a 
preferred position. Their commands are not restricted to cases 
where the protected privilege is sought out for attack. They 
extend at least to every form of taxation which, because it is a 
condition of the exercise of the privilege, is capable of being 
used to control or suppress it. 
Even were we to assume--what I do not concede--that there could be 
a lawful nondiscriminatory license tax of a percentage of the gross 
receipts collected by churches and other religious orders in 
support of their religious work, cf. Giragi v. Moore, 301 U.S. 670, 
57 S.Ct. 946, 81 L.Ed. 1334, we have no such tax here (316 U.S. 
584, 608-09). 
Justice Murphy similarly placed the right of the people "to worship 
their Maker" at the apex of constitutional liberties and argued that a 
flat fee bearing no relation to the ability to pay is inherently unfair, 
comparing the tax unfavorably with the treatment of dissenters by the 
early religious establishments: "Research reveals no attempt to control 
or persecute by the more subtle means of taxing the function of 
preaching, or even any attempt to tap it as a source of revenue" (316 
u.s. 584' 623) . 
A turnabout came the following year after Justice Wiley Rutledge 
joined the Court. A series of decisions were handed down in May and 
June that were united by their identification with the Jehovah's 
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Witnesses. One case involved compulsory flag salutes. But the other 
four grew out of the distribution of religious literature, including a 
new decision in Jones v. City of Opelika, 310 U.S. 103 (1943), in which 
the Court reversed itself. In all but one of the latter, the Court 
split five to four. 
In Murdoch v. Pennsylvania, 310 U.S. 105 (1943), the Court 
overturned a Jeannette city ordinance requiring itinerant evangelists to 
pay a license fee. Justice Douglas, who wrote for a new majority, 
equated the practice of missionary evangelism with "the more orthodox 
and conventional exercises of religion." 
The hand distribution of religious tracts is an age-old form of 
missionary evangelism--as old as the history of the printing 
presses .... Its purpose is as evangelical as the revival 
meeting. This form of religious activity occupies the same high 
estate under the First Amendment as do worship in the churches and 
preaching from the pulpits (310 U.S. 105, 108). 
He did not concede that the sale of religious literature by these 
colporteurs transformed evangelism into a commercial enterprise, 
maintaining that if it did "the passing of the collection plate in 
church would make the church service a commercial project." But he also 
did not believe that religious groups should be "free from all financial 
burdens of government:" 
We have here something quite different, for example, from a tax on 
the income of one who engages in religious activities or a tax on 
property used or employed in connection with those activities. It 
is one thing to impose a tax on the income or property of a 
preacher. It is quite another thing to exact a tax from him for 
the privilege of delivering a sermon .... The power to tax the 
exercise of a privilege is the power to control or suppress its 
enjoyment .... Those who can tax the privilege of engaging in 
this form of missionary evangelism can close its doors to all those 
who do not have a full purse (310 U.S. 105, 112). 
He compared the power to impose a license tax with the power of 
censorship and denied that it bore any relation to a regulatory 
purpose. 
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In Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943), the contested 
ordinance merely made it unlawful for a person distributing handbills to 
summon a resident to the door in the process. In his majority opinion, 
Justice Black emphasized the broad scope given to the enjoyment of First 
Amendment freedoms. He granted that door to door distributors "may be 
either a nuisance or a blind for criminal activities," but then 
suggested that the dangers of abuse were best met by "leaving to each 
householder the full right to decide whether he will receive strangers 
as visitors .. " (319 U.S. 141, 145, 147). He reminded the Court that 
criminal trespass is still a punishable offense and indicated that 
communities may regulate the time, place, and manner of distributing 
circulars so as to prevent, for example, the spread of communicable 
diseases or the disruption of church services. 
But in Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943), a 
unanimous Court upheld the dismissal of a bill of complaint seeking 
injunctive relief against further criminal prosecution of colporteurs as 
a violation of their civil rights. Chief Justice Stone found no reason 
to suppose that the city would not acquiesce in the Murdock ruling, 
which overturned the ordinance in question, and held that a federal 
court of equity should not attempt to determine in advance other issues 
that "will be deemed to abridge freedom of speech and religion." 
The various dissents in the Jones, Murdoch, and Opelika cases 
turned on an iota of difference between the two camps on the issue of 
religious liberty. All sides conceded that religious liberty is 
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limited. They simply differed, as Justice Robert Jackson wrote a year 
later, as to "the method of establishing limitations which of necessity 
bound religious freedom." 
Justice Reed emphasized the taxation issue in his dissent: "It has 
never been thought before that freedom from taxation was a prerequisite 
attaching to the privileges of the First Amendment. The national 
Government grants exemptions to ministers and churches because it wishes 
to do so, not because the Constitution compels" (319 U.S. 105, 130). He 
believed that the Court's decision forced a ''tax subsidy notwithstanding 
our accepted belief in the separation of church and state" and 
concluded: "The Court now holds that the First Amendment wholly exempts 
the church and press from a privilege tax, presumably by the national as 
well as the state governments" (319 U.S. 105, 133). 
Justice Felix Frankfurter wholly agreed with Justice Reed but 
commented further on the tax issue, noting that the petitioners insisted 
on "absolute immunity from any kind of monetary exaction for their 
occupation" (319 U.S. 105, 134). He denied that taxes on the income of 
clergymen and church-held lands were exempted by the Constitution, then 
took exception to the Court's contention that the "power to tax the 
exercise of a privilege is the power to control or suppress its 
enjoyment." 
The power to tax is the power to destroy only in the sense that 
those who have the power can misuse it. Mr. Justice Holmes 
disposed of this smooth phrase as a constitutional basis for 
invalidating taxes when he wrote "The power to tax is not the power 
to destroy while this Court sits." Panhandle Oil Co. v. State of 
Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 277 U.S. 218, 223, 48 S.Ct. 451, 453, 72 
L.Ed. 857, 56 A.L.R. 583. The fact that a power can be perverted 
does not mean that every exercise of the power is a perversion of 
the power (319 U.S. 105, 137). 
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Citing the additional costs to the city of maintaining peace and 
assuring security during the campaign, he continued: "The real issue 
here is not whether a city may charge for the dissemination of ideas but 
whether the states have power to require those who need additional 
facilities to help bear the cost of furnishing such facilities" (319 
U.S. 105, 139). He found "nothing in the Constitution which exempts 
persons engaged in religious activities from sharing equally in the 
costs of benefits to all, including themselves, provided by government" 
(319 u.s. 105, 140). 
Justice Jackson wrote the most detailed dissenting opinion, 
beginning with a review of the record in the Douglas case to show the 
character of the "Watch Tower Campaign" of 1939 that had precipitated 
the case. The mayor of the city met with the "zone servant" in charge 
of the campaign and indicated that Jehovah's Witnesses were at liberty 
to distribute their literature in the streets and free of charge from 
door to door, "but that the people objected to their attempt to force 
these sales, and particularly on Sunday." But this was rejected by the 
sect, which took a confrontational position and proceeded with its 
campaign as planned on Palm Sunday. Over one hundred Witnesses were 
driven to a temporary headquarters outside the city limits. Bonds were 
furnished to those who were arrested. When the complaints exceeded the 
number that could be handled by the police, firemen were called in to 
assist. 
As he turned his attention to the national structure of the 
movement, Justice Jackson underscored its lack of financial records, its 
secretiveness, and its different methods of paying the full-time and 
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part-time ministers who distributed the literature. He also quoted at 
length from this literature, citing denunciations of religion in general 
and the Roman Catholic hierarchy in particular. In one book by Judge 
Rutherford, Witnesses were instructed to descend like locusts on the 
homes of the people to "'get the kingdom message right into the house 
and . take the veneer off the religious things that are in that 
house ... " (319 U.S. 157, 172). After describing the incidents that 
punctuated this campaign, Justice Jackson criticized his brethren for 
merely censoring the draftsmanship of the ordinances without providing 
guidelines by which communities could frame new ones: 
If the local authorities must draw closer aim at evils than they 
did in these cases I doubt that they can ever hit them. What 
narrow area of regulation exists under these decisions? ... If 
the entire course of concerted conduct revealed to us is immune, I 
should think it neither fair nor wise to throw out to the cities 
encouragement to try new restraints. If some part of it passes the 
boundary of immunity, I think we should say what part and why in 
these cases we are denying the right to regulate it (319 U.S. 157, 
178). 
He also criticized the elevation of religious liberty to a higher status 
than other rights: "I had not supposed that the rights of secular and 
nonreligious communications were more narrow or in any way inferior to 
those of avowed religious groups'' (319 U.S. 157, 179). 
He concluded with an appeal for a common sense test that asked 
"what the effect would be if the right given to these Witnesses should 
be exercised by all sects and denominations." He was concerned that 
putting behavior as theirs on the same constitutional plane as "'worship 
in the churches and preaching from the pulpits' . would have a 
dangerous tendency towards discrediting religious freedom" (319 U.S. 
157, 180). The faith of the people, he believed, is the ultimate 
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guaranty of civil liberties. In the interest of sustaining that faith, 
he maintained that the Court has an obligation to clearly define the 
reasons for its decisions. 
The Court divided again the following year in Prince v. 
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), when it upheld the conviction of a 
woman for permitting her niece to sell magazines near a street 
intersection. 2 Justice Rutledge, who wrote for the majority of five, 
acknowledged the religious rights of parents as well as children and 
conceded that an identical ordinance applicable to all persons generally 
would be invalid. But he invoked the parens patriae prerogative of the 
state over children and adults, claiming that the "state's authority 
over children's activities is broader than over like actions of adults." 
Citing possible "emotional excitement and psychological or physical 
injury," he doubted that even the presence of an adult could forestall 
situations "wholly inappropriate for children, especially of tender 
years, to face" (321 U.S. 158, 170). He also rejected the Jehovah's 
Witneses contention that the street is their church. 
Justice Jackson, who was joined by Justices Frankfurter and 
Roberts, again dissented, this time alluding to the ironies into which 
the Court was falling: 
The novel feature of this decision is this: the Court holds that a 
state may apply child labor laws to restrict or prohibit an 
activity of which, as recently as last term, it held: "This form of 
religious activity occupies the same high estate under the First 
Amendment as do worship in the churches and preaching from the 
pulpits. It has the same claim to protection as the more orthodox 
and conventional exercises of religion" (321 U.S. 158, 176). 
Although he still found it difficult "to believe that going upon the 
streets to accost the public is the same thing as withdrawing to a 
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private structure for religious worship," he believed that under the 
Murdock rule "it would seem that child labor laws may be applied to both 
if to either. If the Murdock doctrine stands along with today's 
decision, a foundation is laid for any state intervention in the 
indoctrination and participation of children in religion, provided it is 
done in the name of their health and welfare" (321 U.S. 158, 177). 
Justice Jackson reiterated his earlier appeal for a common sense 
test that would leave purely religious activities "as nearly absolutely 
free as anything can be" but allow secular activities--such as 
''money-making activities on a public scale"--to be regulated: 
The Court in the Murdock case rejected this principle of separating 
immune religious activities from secular ones in declaring the 
disabilities which the Constitution imposed on local authorities. 
Instead, the Court now draws a line based on age that cuts across 
both true exercise of religion and auxiliary secular activities. I 
think this is not a correct principle for defining the activities 
immune from regulation on grounds of religion, and Murdock 
overrules the grounds on which I think affirmance should rest. I 
have no alternative but to dissent from the grounds of affirmance 
of a judgment which I think was rightly decided, and upon right 
grounds, by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts (321 U.S. 
158, 178). 
Justice Murphy, however, challenged the conviction itself, 
contending that the state had failed to meet its burden of proving the 
reasonableness of the prohibition. He found no evidence in the record 
to indicate that "such activity was likely to affect adversely the 
health, morals and welfare of the child" and deemed it unlikely that 
children engaged in a serious religious activity were "'subject to all 
the diverse influences of the street'" (321 U.S. 158, 174-75). 
In Follett v. Town of McCormick, S.C., 321 U.S. 573 (1944), the 
Court similarly split over the issue of taxation when it struck down an 
ordinance requiring agents selling books to pay either a daily or annual 
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license fee. The appellant was not an itinerant evangelist but a rather 
a resident of the town. The record showed that he earned his livelihood 
by the sale of his religious books. The three dissenters believed that 
his exemption from an occupational tax other street vendors were 
required to pay amounted to a subsidy of his religion. 
This long series of cases came to a conclusion with Marsh v. 
Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), and Tucker v. Texas, 326 U.S. 517 (1946). 
In the first, the Court rejected the right of a company-owned town to 
refuse colporteurs access to a business block freely used by the public 
in general. The Texas case involved a government-owned village but was 
otherwise indistinguishable from the Alabama case. The dissenters 
contended that the ruling in the first case was particularly unnecessary 
because the distribution of literature could readily be confined to the 
public highway that abutted the district and were disturbed by the 
ramifications of forcing "private owners to open their property for the 
practice there of religious activities or propaganda distasteful to the 
owner .. " (326 U.S. 501, 516-17). But three years later, the Court 
declined to extend this precedent to a private apartment building in 
Watchtower Society v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 335 U.S. 886 
(1949), cert. denied. 
During the entire series, the Court reached a consensus only in the 
Lovell, Cantwell, and Douglas cases. The other decisions disclosed the 
beginnings of a deep-seated and long-lasting rift within the Court. 
Justices Black, Douglas, Rutledge, and Chief Justice Stone generally 
voted as one bloc; Justices Frankfurter, Jackson, and Roberts as 
another. Justice Murphy joined the dissenters on one occasion when he 
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believed that the interests of religious liberty were better served. 
Justice Reed, who was normally among the dissenters, concurred in the 
Follett case because he concluded that the Court's rulings had become 
law. The unsettled state of judicial doctrine persisted, as subsequent 
cases show. 
By failing to come to terms with the problem of defining the scope 
of religious liberty, which became the major issue in the Opelika, 
Murdock, and Martin cases, the Court resorted to an ungainly case by 
case approach that tempted state and local governments with the 
inference that regulation of canvassing was still permissible in some 
unspecified form. But despite the decision in the Prince case, in which 
the ideological discord within the Court reached its highest pitch, such 
a hope' proved illusory. By 1944, the way had already been prepared for 
a redefinition of religion. The dichotomy between belief and action 
kept the problem of defining the scope of religious practice ever close 
at hand. 
The Ballard Case 
Three months after its Prince decision, the Supreme Court took a 
large step toward redefining religion and expanding its privileges in 
United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944). The late Guy Ballard, a 
student of the mystic arts, had for some time represented himself as the 
chosen instrument of certain ''ascended masters," including Saint 
Germain, Jesus, George Washington, and Godfre Ray King. Before his 
death, he and two members of his family, who circulated literature and 
solicited funds for his "I Am" movement, had been charged with making 
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false representations and were convicted of mail fraud. 
The Court reversed the convictions in a five to four split 
decision. Justice Douglas quoted the Watson dictum for support: "'The 
law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of no dogma, the 
establishment of no sect"' (322 U.S. 78, 86). Relying on the Cantwell 
formulation of the belief-action dichotomy, he ventured into new 
territory by making sincerity, but not veracity, a test of belief: 
The religious views espoused by respondents might seem incredible, 
if not preposterous, to most people. But if those doctrines are 
subject to trial before a jury charged with finding their truth or 
falsity, then the same can be done with the religious beliefs of 
any sect. When the triers of fact undertake that task, they enter 
a forbidden domain ... (322 U.S. 78, 87). 
Chief Justice Stone dissented, holding that such a determination 
could properly be made by a jury: 
I am not prepared to say that the constitutional guaranty of 
freedom of religion affords immunity from criminal prosecution for 
the fraudulent procurement of money by false statements as to one's 
religious experiences, more than it renders polygamy or libel 
immune from criminal prosecution (322 U.S. 78, 88-89). 
The Chief Justice had the support of common law precedent as, for 
example, in Lord Manfield's speech before the House of Lords in 
Chamberlain of London v. Evans regarding inquiry into the bona fides of 
a dissenter "who bepleads the Toleration act:" 
It has been said, that "this being a matter between God and a man's 
own conscience, it cannot come under the cognizance of a jury." 
But certainly it may: and though God alone is the absolute judge of 
a man's religious profession, and of his conscience; yet there are 
some marks even of sincerity, among which there is none more 
certain than consistency. Surely a man's sincerity may be judged 
of by overt acts: It is a just and excellent maxim, which will hold 
good i~ this as in all other cases, "By their fruits ye shall know 
them." 
Justice Jackson also dissented, but on entirely different grounds, 
maintaining the case should have been thrown out: 
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In the first place, as a matter of either practice of philosophy I 
do not see how we can separate an issue as to what is believed from 
considerations as to what is believable .. 
If we try religious sincerity severed from religious verity, we 
isolate the dispute from the very considerations which in common 
experience provide its most reliable answer ... (322 U.S. 78, 92, 
93). 
He concluded: "I would dismiss the indictment and have done with this 
business of judicially examining other people's faith" (322 U.S. 78, 
95). 
All three opinions in the Ballard case showed a similar perplexity 
concerning the interpretation and application of the free exercise 
clause. It was an isolated case, but the decision carried the risk of 
trivializing the definition of religion. Justice Jackson's comments on 
the harmful effects of religious fraud--which recall his appeal for a 
common sense test and respect for the faith of the people--apply with 
particular force to a more general loss of respect for law: 
The chief wrong which false prophets do to their following is not 
financial. The collections aggregate a tempting total, but 
individual payments are not ruinous. I doubt if the vigilance of 
the law is equal to making money stick by over-credulous people. 
But the real harm is on the mental and spiritual plane .... The 
wrong of these things, as I see it, is not in the money the victims 
part with half so much as in the mental and spiritual poison they 
get. But that is precisely the thing the Constitution put beyond 
the reach of the prosecutor, for the price of freedom of religion 
or of speech or of the press is that we must put up with, and even 
pay for, a good deal of rubbish (322 U.S., 94, 95). 
Compulsory Flag Salutes 
At the time of the incorporation of the free exercise clause in its 
Cantwell decision, the Court repeated a pattern that typified its bold 
advances on that front by refusing to otherwise break new ground in the 
extension of civil liberties protections, perhaps enabling it to 
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consolidate its position. This time the advance was immediately 
followed by a retreat from the libertarian stance, two weeks after its 
Cantwell ruling, in Minerville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 
(1940), which was the first of the celebrated compulsory flag salute 
cases to be given a full discussion. 
The case and its outcome recalled some of the free speech cases 
that followed the First World War, like Schenck v. United States, 249 
U.S. 47 (1919), in which the Court affirmed the criminal conviction of 
civilians for circulating antidraft leaflets among soldiers and Justice 
Holmes delivered his famous "clear and present danger" opinion. Once 
again, as in the private school cases, the issue was Americanism. 
In 1935, Lillian and William Gobitis had been expelled from 
Minersville Public School for refusing to salute the national flag as 
required at their daily school exercises. The children believed that to 
do so was contrary to the law of God (Exod. 20:4-5) and that a failure 
to obey this command would result in their eternal destruction. Their 
father, Walter Gobitis applied to the federal district court for an 
injunction on the grounds that the religious beliefs of Jehovah's 
Witnesses do not permit them to bow down to graven images, including the 
national flag. He was granted a perpetual injunction even though the 
Supreme Court had already declined to hear a similar case, Leoles v. 
Landers, 192 S.E. 218 (1937), appeal dismissed, 302 U.S. 656 (1937). 
Although the district court ruling was later affirmed by the Circuit 
Court of Appeals, the children were still unable to attend the school. 
The attorneys for the school district cited the Davis rule in 
support of its claim that the refusal of the children to salute the 
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national flag was not founded on a religious belief: 
The act of saluting the flag has no bearing on what a pupil may 
think of his Creator or what are his relations to his Creator. Nor 
is a pupil required to exhibit his religious sentiments in a 
particular "form of worship" when saluting the flag, because the 
ceremony is not, by any stretch of the imagination, a "form of 
worship" (310 U.S. 586, 588). 
They denied that a pupil was in any way prevented "from acknowledging 
the spiritual sovereignty of Almighty God by rendering to God the things 
which are God's." 
In his brief, Joseph Rutherford, one of the attorneys for the 
Gobitis family, summarized the relevant doctrines of the sect and then 
contrasted what he called constitutional with totalitarian government: 
A rule which compels school children to daily participate in a 
formal ceremony, to wit, placing the hand over the heart, 
stretching forth the hand toward the flag and at the same time 
repeating words of reverence and devotion, thereby recognizing the 
State as the sovereign, higher or supreme power, and attributing to 
the Stat4 protection and salvation, is a form of religious 
worship. 
Justice Felix Frankfurter, who wrote for the majority in reversing 
the lower court rulings, regarded the issue as one that touched on the 
very essence of national unity: "We are dealing with an interest 
inferior to none in the hierarchy of legal values. National unity is 
the basis of national security" (310 U.S. 586, 595). He believed that 
''the manifold character of man's relations may bring his conception of 
religious duty into conflict with the secular interests of his 
fellow-men" and that any claim to an unlimited right to follow 
conscience "would deny that very plurality of principles which, as a 
matter of history, underlies protection of religious toleration" (310 
u.s. 586, 593, 594). 
What the school authorities are really asserting is the right to 
330 
awaken in the child's mind considerations as to the significance of 
the flag contrary to those implanted by the parent. In such an 
attempt the state is normally at a disadvantage in competing with 
the parent's authority, so long--and this is the vital aspect of 
religious toleration--as parents are unmolested in their right to 
counteract by their own persuasiveness the wisdom and rightness of 
those loyalties which the state's educational system is seeking to 
promote (3l0 U.S. 586, 599). 
In a sharp dissent that prompted a pained reply from Justice 
Frankfurter, Justice Stone wrote that the essence of civil liberty "is 
the freedom of the individual from compulsion as to what he shall think 
and what he shall say, at least where the compulsion is to bear false 
witness to his religion." 
History teaches us that there have been but few infringements of 
personal liberty by the state which have not been justified, as 
they are here, in the name of righteousness and the public good, 
and few which have not been directed, as they are now, at 
politically helpless minorities. 
. . . I am not persuaded that we should refrain from passing upon 
the legislative judgment "as long as the remedial channels of the 
democratic proces remain open and unobstructed." This seems to me 
no less than the surrender of the constitutional protection of the 
liberty of small minorities to the popular will (3l0 U.S. 586, 604, 
605-06). 
Few Supreme Court decisions have provoked greater controversy. The 
ruling was greeted with outrage by civil libertarians and a wave of 
5 persecutions against members of the sect. 
Three years later, the same issue was decided to the contrary in 
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, Jl9 U.S. 624 (l943), 
following the reversal of the Opelika decision. Here the flag salute 
was part of an overall program "'for the purpose of teaching, fostering 
and perpetuating the ideals, principles and spirit. of Americanism ... '" 
(3l9 U.S. 624, 625). By this time, three justices had switched their 
position. Justice Jackson wrote for the new majority: 
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The sole conflict is between authority and the rights of the 
individual. The State asserts power to condition access to public 
education on making a prescribed sign and profession and at the 
same time to coerce attendance by punishing both parent and child. 
The latter stand on a right of self-determination in matters that 
touch individual opinion and personal attitude (319 U.S. 624, 
630-31). 
He argued that the burden of proving the validity of such a requirement 
rests with its proponents and denied that First Amendment freedoms may 
be infringed simply because a state regulation has a "rational basis:" 
They are susceptible of restriction only to prevent grave and 
immediate danger to interests which the state may lawfully protect. 
It is important to note that while it is the Fourteenth Amendment 
which bears directly upon the state it is the more specific 
limiting principles of the First Amendment that finally govern this 
case (319 U.S. 624, 639). 
The heart of the Gobitis ruling, he believed, was its approval of 
compulsory measures for national unity. While he did not quarrel with 
the end, he stipulated that it be achieved through permissible means: 
Ultimate futility of such attempts to compel coherence is the 
lesson of every such drive from the Roman drive to stamp out 
Christianity as a disturber of its pagan unity, the Inquisition, as 
a means to religious and dynastic unity, the Siberian exiles as a 
means to Russian unity, down to the fast failing efforts of our 
present totalitarian enemies. Those who begin coercive elimination 
of dissent soon find themselves exterminating dissenters. 
Compulsory unification of opinion achieves only the unanimity of 
the graveyard. 
It seems trite but necessary to say that the First Amendment to our 
Constitution was designed to avoid these ends by avoiding these 
beginnings (319 U.S. 624, 641 ). 
He concluded by emphasizing that the Bill of Rights was designed to 
protect intellectual and spiritual diversity and prevent those in 
authority from coercing consent from the governed: 
To believe that patriotism will not flourish if patriotic 
ceremonies are voluntary and spontaneous instead of a compulsory 
routine is to make an unflattering estimate of the appeal of our 
institutions to free minds. 
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If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it 
is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be 
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of 
opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith 
therein (319 U.S. 624, 641, 642). 
In a concurring .opinion, Justices Black and Douglas explained their 
change of view: 
Reluctance to make the Federal Constitution a rigid bar against 
state regulation of conduct thought inimical to the public welfare 
was the controlling influence which moved us to consent to the 
Gobitis decision. Long reflection convinced us that although the 
principle is sound, its application in the particular case was 
wrong (319 U.S. 624, 643). 
In a separate concurrence, Justice Murphy underscored the importance of 
the freedom to believe: "Reflection has convinced me that as a judge I 
have no loftier duty or responsibility than to uphold that spiritual 
freedom to its farthest reaches" (319 U.S. 624, 645). 
But Justice Frankfurter held firm in his previous position and 
explained his views on "judicial self-restraint" at letigth, believing 
that--despite his sympathy with the libertarian views expressed in the 
Court's opinion--he would be unjustified in writing his private opinions 
about policy into the Constitution: 
We are not reviewing merely the action of a local school board. 
The flag salute requirement in this case comes before us with the 
full authority of the State of West Virginia. We are in fact 
passing judgment on 'the power of the State as a whole'. To 
suggest that we are here concerned with the heedless action of some 
village tyrants is to distort the augustness of the constitutional 
issue and the reach of the consequences of our decision" (319 U.S. 
624, 650-51 ). 
In the case of "a general non-discriminatory civil regulation" that 
touches on conscientious scruples, he wrote, it is the province of the 
legislature to make accommodations. "If the function of this Court is 
to be essentially no different from that of a legislature, ... then 
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indeed judges should not have life tenure and they should be made 
directly responsible to the electorate" (319 U.S. 624, 652). 
Justice Frankfurter proceeded to examine the constitutional 
provision for religious liberty and concluded that it did not create new 
privileges: 
It gave religious equality, not civil immunity. 
freedom from conformity to religious dogma, not 
conformity to law because of religious dogma .. 
Its essence is 
freedom from 
Law is concerned with external behavior and not with the inner life 
of man. It rests in large measure upon compulsion .... the 
individual conscience may profess what faith it chooses. It may 
affirm and promote that faith ... but it cannot thereby restrict 
community action through political organs in matters of community 
concern, so long as the action is not asserted in a discriminatory 
way either openly or by stealth. One may have to practice one's 
religion and at the same time owe the duty of formal obedience to 
laws that run contrary to one's beliefs. Compelling belief implies 
denial of opportunity to combat it and to assert dissident views. 
Such compulsion is one thing. Quite another matter is submission 
to conformity of action while denying its wisdom or virtue and with 
ample opportunity for seeking its change or abrogation (319 U.S. 
624, 653, 655-56). 
He found nothing in the flag salute requirement to distinguish it from 
the military training requirement in the Hamilton case and quoted 
Justice Benjamin Cardozo's concurring opinion in that case: "'The right 
of private judgment has never yet been so exalted above the powers and 
the compulsion of the agencies of government'" (293 U.S. 245, 268; 319 
u.s. 624, 657). 
If the Court were to make an exception in this instance, he 
continued, it must similarly deal with other complexities that arise out 
of the administration of local school systems. He cited as examples 
compulsory Bible reading, the teaching of either creation or evolution, 
the chauvinistic teaching of history, and the double educational burden 
carried by parents who do not send their children to public schools. 
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These questions are not lightly stirred. They touch the most 
delicate issues and their solution challenges the best wisdom of 
political and religious statesmen. But it presents awful 
possibilities to try to encase the solution of these problems 
within the rigid prohibitions of unconstitutionality (319 U.S. 624, 
661). 
Against the argument that symbolism is a primitive way of communicating 
ideas, he replied that it is inescapable and rejected as flippant 
another argument that the "requirement to salute the flag implies equal 
validity of a requirement to salute a dictator." Unlike an oath test, 
saluting the flag suppresses no belief. 
But Justice Frankfurter felt most fortified in his view by the 
Court's own handling of the flag salute controversy. Thirteen justices 
including all but the two who were sitting on the matter for the first 
time had previously "found no constitutional infirmity in what is now 
condemned." 
The Court has no reason for existence if it merely reflects the 
pressures of the day. Our system is built on the faith that men 
set apart for this special function, freed from the influences of 
immediacy and from the deflections of worldly ambition, will become 
able to take a view of longer range than the period of 
responsibility entrusted to Congress and the legislatures. We are 
dealing with matters as to which legislators and voters have 
conflicting views. Are we as judges to impose our strong 
convictions on where wisdom lies? That which three years ago had 
seemed to five successive Courts to lie within permissible areas of 
legislation is now outlawed by the deciding shift of opinion of two 
Justices. What reason is there to believe that they or their 
successors may not have another view a few years hence? Is that 
which was deemed to be of so fundamental a nature as to be written 
into the Constitution to endure for all times to be the sport of 
shifting winds of doctrine? Of course, judicial opinions, even as 
to questions of constitutionality, are not immutable. As has been 
true in the past, the Court will from time to time reverse its 
position. But I believe that never before these Jehovah's 
Witnesses cases (except for minor deviations subsequently retraced) 
has this Court overruled decisions so as to restrict the powers of 
democratic government. Always heretofore, it has withdrawn narrow 
views of legislative authority so as to authorize what formerly it 
had denied (319 U.S. 624, 665-66). 
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The ''minor deviations" to which he referred were an older variety 
of judicial activism that at times used the doctrine of substantive due 
process to overturn legislative innovations. "Such undefined 
destructive power was not conferred on this Court by the Constitution." 
But the new activism similarly troubled him as an uncontrollable power. 
He concluded: 
Of course patriotism cannot be enforced by the flag salute. But 
neither can the liberal spirit be enforced by judicial invalidation 
of illiberal legislation. Our constant preoccupation with the 
constitutionality of legislation rather than with its wisdom tends 
to preoccupation of the American mind with a false value. The 
tendency of focusing attention on constitutionality is to make 
constitutionality synonymous with wisdom, to regard a law as all 
right if it is constitutional. Such an attitude is a great enemy 
of liberalism. Particularly in legislation affecting freedom of 
thought and freedom of speech much which should offend a 
free-spirited society is constitutional. Reliance for the most 
precious interests of civilization, therefore, must be found 
outside of their vindication in courts of law. Only a persistent 
positive translation of th~ faith of a free society into the 
convictions and habits and actions of a community is the ultimate 
reliance against unabated temptations to fetter the human spirit 
(319 u.s. 624, 670-71 ). 
In a companion decision, Taylor v. Mississippi, 319 U.S. 583 
(1943), the Court reversed the convictions of three Jehovah's Witnesses 
for disseminating teachings and literature tending ''to create an 
attitude of stubborn refusal to salute, honor, and respect the flag and 
government of the United States." Justice Roberts, who was one of the 
three dissenters in the Barnette case, wrote for a unanimous Court: "If 
the state cannot Gonstrain one to violate his conscientious religious 
conviction by saluting the national emblem, then certainly it cannot 
punish him for imparting his views on the subject to his fellows and 
exhorting them to accept those views" (319 U.S. 583, 589). 
More than three decades later, the Court recalled the Barnette 
336 
precedent in a related case concerning symbolic expression and a 
"required affirmation of belief." In Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 
(1977), which involved a husband and wife who were members of Jehovah's 
Witnesses, the Court affirmed an award of injunctive and declaratory 
relief against further arrests and prosecutions for violating two 
statutes: one that required all noncommercial vehicles to bear license 
plates embossed with the state motto, "Live Free or Die," and another 
that made it a misdemeanor to deliberately obscure "the figures or 
letters on any license plate." The husband had been cited three times 
in a three month period and had served a sentence of 15 days for 
covering over the motto because he refused to advertise a slogan he 
found "morally, ethically, and politically abhorrent." Three justices, 
however, dissented in whole or part, including Justice Rehnquist, who 
faulted the Court's logic and contended that the comparable use of 
currency by an atheist "does not convey any affirmation of belief on his 
part in the motto 'In God We Trust"' (430 U.S. 705, 722). 
The flag salute cases, which so clearly recorded the changes in 
judicial philosophy during this time of transition, were complicated by 
the clash of competing values. As in the Meyer and Pierce cases, the 
issues of national unity, family rights, and intellectual liberty, and 
religious liberty were once again raised. Justice Frankfurter 
understood the issue as an unequal competition between parental 
authority and whatever loyalties the state's educational system may seek 
to promote. But a practical test of the scope and limits of each sphere 
was nowhere in evidence. 
Three considerations in particular were frequently addressed by the 
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Court during this period: jurisdiction, judicial reasoning, and justice 
of the outcome. The problems created by the Court's expansion of its 
area of jurisdiction were probably most clearly delineated by Justice 
Frankfurter. The first three flag salute cases, he reminded his 
brethren, had been dismissed for want of a substantial federal question. 
Now, by its change of course, he believed the Court was "passing 
judgment on 'the power of the State as a whole"' (319 U.S. 524, 650). 
Justice Jackson, in turn, was especially sensitive to the problem 
of sharply defining the scope of religious liberty. He generally agreed 
with the Court's earlier reservations against exalting private judgment 
over the lawmaking authority. In most cases, he lined up with Justice 
Frankfurter. The Barnette decision was one of the exceptions. 
A third consideration--the intrinsic justice of the 
outcome--continues to enter the religion cases and may account as much 
as anything for the unpredictability of the Court's rulings. This 
disposition raises a fundamental question: By what standard is justice 
to be measured? The Court had weighed polygamy in the balances of a 
generalized Christian morality and found it wanting in constitutional 
protection. But no such test was applied in the Barnette case. It is 
in this area of private judgment and conscientious scruples--especially 
those of the justices--that Justice Frankfurter's warning is most 
apropos: "Equally inadmissible is the claim to strike down legislation 
because to us as individuals it seems opposed to the 'plan and purpose' 
of the Constitution. That is too tempting a basis for finding in one's 
personal views the purposes of the Founders" (319 U.S. 624, 666). 
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Speech and Assembly 
Like the religious solicitation cases, the third series of cases 
involving Jehovah's Witnesses typified the trend toward a relaxation of 
the Court's Reynolds and Davis tests. As late as 1940, Justice 
Frankfurter was able to deny that the Gobitis case involved a religious 
issue. By 1944, this would have been unthinkable. Within a few years, 
the credentials of various religions and believers had become virtually 
untestable. The practical effect was to render religious liberty 
increasingly meaningless as a separate and distinct category from the 
other Bill of Rights guarantees. 
Like some of the others, the speech and assembly cases were often 
decided with little reference to purely religious questions. In Cox v. 
New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941), the Court made reference to all the 
First Amendment freedoms: worship, speech, press, and assembly. The 
five appellants had been convicted of violating a statute prohibiting 
unlicensed parades or processions after participating in an "information 
march" in which groups of Witnesses carrying signs marched single-file 
along the sidewalks of Manchester. On appeal, the Court sustained their 
convictions. Chief Justice Hughes wrote: 
The authority of a municipality to impose regulations in order to 
assure the safety and convenience of the people in the use of 
public highways has never been regarded as inconsistent with civil 
liberties but rather as one of the means of safeguarding the good 
order upon which they ultimately depend (312 U.S. 569, 574). 
In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942), the Court 
upheld the conviction of colporteur who, after twice being warned that 
his actions were creating a disturbance, was arrested and charged with 
cursing a public officer. It contended that the prevention and 
339 
punishment of certain limited classes of speech had "never been thought 
to raise any Constitutional problems. These include the lewd and 
obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' 
words--those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to 
incite an immediate breach of the peace." 
The Court's decision in Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948), 
however, mirrors the sharp disagreements and even antagonisms that had 
subsequently arisen within the Court. The case hinged on the use of 
sound amplification equipment by a minister of the Jehovah's Witnesses 
in a public park. Justice Black, writing for the majority of five, saw 
it as another instance of prior restraint on speech, noting that the 
ordinance forbade the use of such equipment where the sound was cast 
directly on public places unless permission were granted by the police 
chief. Any "abuses which loud-speakers create," he asserted, "can be 
controlled by narrowly drawn statutes" (334 U.S. 558, 562). 
Justice Frankfurter dissented: "modern devices for amplifying the 
range and volume of the human voice . afford easy, too easy, 
opportunities for aural aggression. If uncontrolled, the result is 
intrusion into cherished privacy'' (334 U.S. 558, 563). Justice Jackson 
even contended that the decision actually endangered the right of free 
speech "by making it ridiculous and obnoxious" and testily commented: 
"It was setting up this system of microphone, wires and sound truck 
without a permit, that this appellant was convicted--it was not for 
speaking" (334 U.S. 558, 567). 
Seven months later, the Saia dissenters picked up the vote of Chief 
Justice Fred Vinson in Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949), and upheld 
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the conviction of a labor organizer for violating an ordinance 
prohibiting the use of sound amplifying devices to make "loud and 
raucous noises." Although the Court did not so rule, Justice Jackson 
agreed with Justice Black and two other dissenters that the it was a 
repudiation of the Saia decision. 
A third five to four split decision followed in Terminiello v. City 
of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949), reversing the statutory breach of peace 
conviction of Father Arthur Terminiello, a suspended priest, for 
provoking a crowd gathered outside the auditorium where he spoke. 
Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, avoided the issue of 
"fighting words" by singling out the original instructions to the jury, 
in which the words "breach of peace" were so defined as to include 
speech. Although Albert Dilling, the petitioner's counsel, had not 
objected to the instruction, Justice Douglas wrote that "the gloss which 
Illinois placed on the ordinance gives it a meaning and application 
which are conclusive on us" (337 U.S. 1, 5). 
In his dissent, Chief Justice Vinson noted that the "offending 
sentence in the instructions to the jury has heretofore gone completely 
undetected:" Justice Frankfurter made a similar point: 
For the first time in the course of the 130 years in which State 
prosecutions have come here for review, this Court is today 
reversing a sentence imposed by a State court on a ground that was 
urged neither here nor below and that was explicitly disclaimed on 
behalf of the petitioner at the bar of this Court (337 U.S. 1, 
8-9). 
But it was Justice Jackson--formerly an Attorney General and the 
chief American prosecutor in the war crimes trial at Nuremberg--who 
delved into the trial record, as he had done in the Douglas case, in 
order to remove the discussion from the rarefied atmosphere of 
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philosophical abstraction. He first recited the details of the speech 
''that provoked a hostile mob and incited a friendly one,'' then described 
the two groups that were involved: 
This was not an isolated, spontaneous and unintended collision of 
political, racial or ideological adversaries. It was a local 
manifestation of a world-wide and standing conflict between two 
organized groups of revolutionary fanatics, each of which has 
imported to this country the strong-arm technique developed in the 
struggle by which their kind has devastated Europe. Increasingly, 
American cities have to cope with it. One faction organizes a mass 
meeting, the other organizes pickets to harass it; each organizes 
squads to counteract the other's pickets; parade is met with 
counterparade. Each of these mass demonstrations has the 
potentiality, and more than a few the purpose, of disorder and 
violence. This technique appeals not to reason but to fears and 
mob spirit; each is a show of force designed to bully adversaries 
and to overawe the indifferent. We need not resort to speculation 
as to the purposes for which these tactics are calculated nor as to 
their consequences. Recent European history demonstrates both (337 
u.s. 1' 23). 
He found it impossible to square this ruling with the Cantwell and 
Chaplinsky decisions. But he also raised the incorporation issue and 
called for restaint: 
The Fourteenth Amendment forbade states to deny the citizen ''due 
process of law." But its terms gave no notice to the people that 
its adoption would strip their local governments of power to deal 
with such problems of local peace and order as we have here. Nor 
was it hinted by this Court for over half a century that the 
Amendment might have any such effect. In 1922, with concurrence of 
the most liberty-alert Justices of all times--Holmes and 
Brandeis--this Court declared flatly that the Constitution does not 
limit the power of the state over free speech. Prudential 
Insurance co. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530, 543, 42 S.Ct. 516, 522, 66 
L.Ed. 1044, 27 A.L.R. 27. In later years the Court shifted its 
dogma and decreed that the Constitution does this very thing and 
that state power is bound by the same limitation as Congress. 
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 45 S.Ct. 625, 69 L.Ed. 1138. I 
have no quarrel with this history. See West Virginia State Board 
of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 L.Ed. 
1628, 147 A.L.R. 674. I recite the method by which the right to 
limit the state has been derived only from this Court's own 
assumption of the power, with never a submission of legislation or 
amendment into which the people could write any qualification to 
prevent abuse of this liberty, as bearing upon the restraint I 
consider as becoming in exercise of self-given and unappealable 
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power (337 U.S. 1, 28-29). 
In Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951 ), the Court unanimously 
reversed the conviction of two Jehovah's Witnesses for disorderly 
conduct, finding no evidence of disorder or threat of violence at the 
time they were arrested at a public park while giving Bible talks. No 
ordinance was involved. But in Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951 ), 
the Court overturned an ordinance that made it unlawful to hold meetings 
on the streets of New York City without a permit from the police 
commissioner. The appellant was an ordained Baptist minister whose 
permit was revoked in 1946 "on evidence that he had ridiculed other 
religious beliefs in his meetings." Although the minister did not 
challenge the revocation, he contended that his subsequent applications 
for a permit were rejected without explanation. He was fined in 1948 
for holding a religious meeting without a permit. 
Justice Jackson's dissent in the latter case was reminiscent of his 
Terminiello opinion. Noting that a fight had broken out after the 
minister denounced Catholics and Jews in the vilest terms, he believed 
that the police may require a speaker to temporarily yield his 
unquestioned right of free speech during emergency situations involving 
angry crowds. He quoted the Cantwell decision in support of this 
principle: "'Resort to epithets or personal abuse is not in any proper 
sense communication of information or or opinion safeguarded by the 
Constitution'" (310 U.S. 296, 309-10; 340 U.S. 290, 302-03). 
Two years later a unanimous Court reversed the conviction of a 
Jehovah's Witness for violating an ordinance that prohibited anyone from 
addressing a political or religious meeting in any public park. Justice 
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Douglas pointed out that the ordinance, as construed and applied by the 
City of Pawtucket, did not forbid church services in the park. In 
effect, some religious groups were given preference: 
Appellant's sect has conventions that are different from the 
practices of other religious groups. Its religious service is less 
ritualistic, more unorthodox, less formal than some. But apart 
from narrow exceptions not relevant here, Reynolds v. United 
States, 98 U.S. 145, 25 L.Ed. 244; Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 
10 S.Ct. 299, 33 L.Ed. 637, it is no business of courts to say that 
what is a religious practice or activity for one group is not 
religion under the protection of the First Amendment. 
In Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953), however, the Court 
upheld the conviction of another Jehovah's Witness for conducting 
religious services in a public park after having been arbitrarily 
refused a license by the city council and rejected his contention that 
the ordinance in question was unconstitutional. Justice Reed, who wrote 
for the majority, noted that it had been narrowly construed by the state 
courts so as to permit no discretion, discrimination, or interference 
with free speech. The Court held that redress must be sought through 
appropriate judicial procedure, annoying and expensive though it may be. 
Justice Douglas, who was joined by Justice Black in his dissent, 
contended that the First Amendment forbade "even a reasonable regulation 
of the right of free speech" (345 U.S. 395, 425). 
A final case that falls into this general category is Burstyn v. 
Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952), in which the Court unanimously reversed the 
New York Board of Regent's revocation of a movie operator's license for 
showing a film, "The Miracle," alleged to be sacrilegious. Justice Tom 
Clark pointed out that "the state has no legitimate interest in 
protecting any or all religions from views distasteful to them which is 
sufficient to justify prior restraints upon the expression of those 
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views" (343 U.S. 495, 505). In a lengthy concurring opinion, Justice 
Frankfurter recounted the history of prohibitions against sacrilege and 
blasphemy, noting that sacrilege--which means "church-robbing"--was 
restricted in Roman Catholic doctrine and most dictionary definitions to 
"the physical abuse of physical objects" Hhile blasphemy encompassed 
verbal offenses of the sort alleged. Under the tradition of state 
religion, blasphemy became "the chameleon phrase which meant the 
criticism of whatever the ruling authority of the moment established as 
orthodox religious doctrine ... " (343 U.S. 495, 529). But, he noted, 
even the English common law crime of blasphemy had by then been 
considerably limited. He contrasted this with the "vague, undefinable 
powers of censorship" the New York courts permitted. 
These cases cut a striking contrast with the earlier religious 
solicitation series. The note of urgency and the strong emphasis on the 
unique claims of religious liberty are--with one or two 
exceptions--missing in these cases, many of which leave an impression 
almost of diffidence. The religious issues had by now become barely 
distinguishable from the free speech and assembly issues and the 
"preferred position" of religion soon became a plural preference that 
embraced the entire First Amendment. The passion that brought great 
minds into play had perhaps, as the novelty of the issues wore thin, 
dissipated into a routine of hairsplitting analyses and shifting 
alliances that often left the justices at loggerheads. 
This does not mean that all the important issues had been settled. 
After the war, other matters--especially those relating to internal 
security--began challenging the attention and stretching the resources 
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of the Court. The next set of burning religious issues--aid to private 
schools and religion in public schools--brought the establishment clause 
to center stage. The public debate over religion in education flared 
briefly in 1947 and 1948 before being ignited in earnest in the early 
1960s. It was only then that free exercise issues involving questions 
of religious conscience were once again given full attention. But by 
then the terms of the constitutional debate had begun to change in 
response to a changing religious environment and to accommodate a 
growing theological debate over fundamental religious questions. In the 
process, the Court's definition of religion evolved from a theistic to 
an increasingly pantheistic and even nontheistic basis. 
The Establishment Clause 
The flood of free exercise cases that followed the Cantwell 
decision was not followed by a similar burst of activity on the 
establishment side of the ledger until the early 1960s. But beginning 
in 1947, a controversial series of establishment cases led to the 
toppling of some of the major pillars of civil religion in America, 
resulting in acute and lasting divisions both within society and within 
the Court. Even though judicial doctrine concerning religious exercises 
in public school classrooms is now well settled, school prayer still 
persists in many parts of the country and public opinion remains 
unsettled on the issue. The problem of aid to private schools, however, 
is so far from being settled even within the Court that many of its 
recent rulings have been surprising in light of earlier rhetoric about 
building a "wall of separation" between church and state that is "high 
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and impregnable." In fact, school aid was the subject of the first 
major establishment case. 
The Everson Case 
Justice Hugo Black's opinion in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 
U. S. 1 (1947), marks a major constitutional turning point regarding the 
interpretation of the religion clauses. The issue in this case was the 
provision of public transportation to both public and parochial school 
children in the New Jersey township of Ewing. 
Speaking for a divided Court, Justice Black began by disposing of 
the due process objection to the public financing of bus transportation 
for children attending Catholic parochial schools. He cited the Cochran 
ruling in defense of the public purpose served by such aid and applied 
the "child benefit theory." By indicating that these payments promoted 
a legitimate public good--that is, child safety--he appeared to concede 
some ground to the accommodationist position. 
He then turned to the the establishment clause objections and began 
by restating the incorporation rule, citing a passage in the Murdoch 
ruling, after which he proceeded to a lengthy review of the religious 
purposes and persecutions that shaped American history, drawing the 
earlier discussion by Chief Justice Waite in his Reynolds opinion. His 
discourse culminated in a brief reference to the famous Danbury letter 
from which he extrapolated a test to determine whether a particular law 
or policy violated the establishment clause: 
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. 
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or 
prefer one religion over another. Neither can force or influence a 
person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or 
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force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No 
person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious 
beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or nonattendance. No 
tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any 
religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, 
or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. 
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, 
participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or 
groups, and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause 
against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect n~ 
wall of separation between Church and State" (330 U.S. 1, 15-16) 
He concluded by remarking that while the "wall must be kept high and 
impregnable," it had not been breached in this case. 
The Everson test became the standard by which all subsequent 
establishment rulings have been measured. But Justice Black here 
evidenced a greater concern to inject a particular interpretation into 
the establishment clause than to reconcile the separationist theory with 
the accommodationist effect of the ruling. Many of the issues were left 
unresolved, as Mark DeWolfe Howe later observed: 
Justices who have insisted that the Fourteenth Amendment did 
incorporate the Bill of Rights have not always told us which clause 
of the amendment accomplishes the incorporation. We are thus left 
in a condition of considerable uncertainty as to whether the due 
process clause has done the trick. Nor have we been told with 
clarity wha7, precisely, is meant by the Bill of Rights in this 
connection. 
Four members of the Court dissented. Justice Jackson had by then 
become persuaded of the correctness of the separationist position and, 
for that reason, dissented from what he regarded as the Court's failure 
to apply it. He scolded the majority for its inconsistency: 
. the undertones of the opinion, advocating complete and 
uncompromising separation of Church from State, seem utterly 
discordant with its conclusion yielding support to their 
commingling in educational matters. The case which irresistibly 
comes to mind as the most fitting precedent is that of Julia who, 
according to Byron's reports, "whispering 'I will ne'er 
consent, '--consented" (330 U. S. 1, 19). 
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He expressed sympathy with the position of parents who send their 
children to parochial schools, yet must continue to support public 
schools, and noted that that the law in question was defective in the 
first place because it unfairly singled out parochial school pupils for 
reimbursement without providing for children who attended other private 
religious or secular schools. "If we are to decide this case on the 
facts before us," he wrote, ''our question is simply this: Is it 
constitutional to tax this complainant to pay the cost of carrying 
pupils to Church schools of one specified denomination" (330 U.S. 1, 
21 )? But he concluded that such aid would be impermissible even if it 
were distributed equitably, because the establishment clause guarantees 
freedom against taxation for sectarian purposes. He asserted that tax 
aid to church schools is indistinguishable from rendering such aid 
directly to the church. 
In the course of this argument, Justice Jackson made an observation 
which has yet to be pursued further by the Court: 
Our public school, if not a product of Protestantism, at least is 
more consistent with it than with the Catholic culture and scheme 
of values. It is a relatively recent development dating from about 
1840. It is organized on the premise that secular education can be 
isolated from all religious teaching so that the school can 
inculcate all needed temporal knowledge and also maintain a strict 
and lofty neutrality as to religion. The assumption is that after 
the individual has been instructed in worldly wisdom he will be 
better fitted to choose his religion. Whether such a disjunction 
is possible, and if possible whether it is wise, are questions I 
need not try to answer (330 U.S. 1, 23-24). 
This is an important admission and one that merits serious examination. 
But he ruled out any solution that involved aid in any form with the 
argument that the business of the government is to serve all citizens 
equally rather than to single out specific groups for special treatment. 
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He then added that the First Amendment "was intended not only to keep 
the states' hands out of religion, but to keep religion's hands off the 
state, and above all, to keep bitter religious controversy out of public 
life by denying to every denomination any advantage from getting control 
of public policy or the public purse" (330 U.S. 1, 26-27). He capped 
his dissent by arguing that aid from tax funds carries political 
controls with it, citing his earlier opinion in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 
U.S. 111, 131 (1942): "'It is hardly lack of due process for the 
Government to regulate that which it subsidizes.'" (330 U.S. 1, 28). 
A second dissenting opinion was written by Justice Rutledge and 
8 joined by Justices Frankfurter, Jackson, and Harold Burton. Of the 
three opinions, this was the strictest in its formulation of the 
separationist theory. It was also the least reticent in confronting the 
dilemmas posed by the religion clauses and implications of separation. 
Justice Rutledge first of all maintained that the two clauses must be 
interpreted together since they are linked by their common reference to 
religion. Relying on James Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance, he 
argued that not even a small tax can be imposed in support of religion. 
Believing that transportation is "so indispensable an item from the 
composite of total costs," he was unable to accept the argument that 
reimbursement for transportation would not materially aid the 
propagation of religious beliefs. He also rejected justifications based 
on public welfare and child safety that ignored the religious factor. 
He explicitly equated the support of religion with purely private ends. 
He acknowledged that various faiths avow "that the secular cannot 
be and should not be separated from the religious phase and emphasis" 
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and was not unappreciative of the financial burden that was placed on 
parents who "desire a different kind of training others do not demand" 
(330 U.S. 1, 46, 58). "Hardship in fact there is which none can blink," 
he wrote. "But, for assuring to those who undergo it the greater, the 
most comprehensive freedom, it is one written by design and firm intent 
into our law" (330 U.S. 1, 58). He denied, however, that this burden 
was discriminatory in the legal sense: 
Were he to accept the common school, he would be the first to 
protest the teaching there of any creed or faith not his own. And 
it is precisely for the reason that their atmosphere is wholly 
secular that children are not sent to public schools under the 
Pierce doctrine. But that is a constitutional necessity, because 
we have staked the very existence of our country on the faith that 
complete separation between the state and religion is best for the 
state and best for religion (330 U.S. 1, 59). 
This position was as unsatisfactory for some groups, including a 
few that acknowledged the hazards of accepting government money, as the 
Court's ruling was unsatisfactory for others. Neither side came to 
grips with the issue raised by Justice Jackson. Can education and 
religion be truly separated? Is secular education neutral with respect 
to religion or does it tend to take the place of religion?9 Are the 
public schools, as one critic claims, a means of "compelling belief? 1110 
But later cases involving religious exercises in the classroom and 
financial aid to private schools have occasionally grazed the surface of 
these questions. 
Nearly twenty years passed before the Supreme Court again 
confronted the problem. But once it did, the Court's lack of a 
consistent doctrine compounded its difficulty in balancing the 
apparently competing claims of the establishment and free exercise 
precedents. 
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Released Time 
The controversy over the meaning of the establishment clause became 
far more intense when the Supreme Court took its first firm 
separationist stance the following year in McCollum v. Board of 
Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948). Like the famous Scopes trial of a 
generation earlier, the issues and parties involved could not have been 
better calculated to catalyze a public outcry. The appellant, Vashti 
McCollum, had originally sought a writ of mandamus to prohibit religious 
instruction in public school classrooms during regular school hours, a 
practice that is known as released time. The case attracted particular 
notoriety because the complaint was brought by an avowed atheist. 11 The 
school board of Champaign, Illinois challenged her standing to sue. 
Once again, Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court. 
After denying the state's motion to dismiss, he reviewed the facts of 
the case and commented on the close cooperation between school 
authorities and the religious council in promoting religious education: 
The operation of the state's compulsory education system thus 
asists and is integrated with the program of religious instruction 
carried on by the separate religious sects. Pupils compelled by 
law to go to school for secular education are released in part 
from their legal duty upon the condition that they attend the 
religious classes. This is beyond all question a utilization of 
the tax-supported public school system to aid religious groups to 
spread their faith (333 U.S. 203, 209-10). 
Reaffirming the separationist views expressed in the Everson opinions, 
he rejected the school board's contention that "historically the First 
Amendment was intended to forbid only government preference of one 
religion over another, not an impartial governmental assistance of all 
religions" (333 U.S. 203, 211 ). He also denied that the Court was 
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manifesting hostility to religion and urged that "the First Amendment 
rests upon the premise that both religion and government can best work 
to achieve their lofty aims if each is left free from the other within 
its respective sphere" (333 U.S. 203, 212). 
In a separate concurring opinion that spoke for the Everson 
dissenters, Justice Frankfurter remarked that "agreement, in the 
abstract, that the First Amendment was designed to erect a 'wall of 
separation between Church and State,' does not preclude a clash of views 
as to what the wall separates" (333 U.S. 203, 213). He paid particular 
attention to the historical roots and ideological underpinnings of the 
popular education movement: 
The secular public school did not imply indifference to the basic 
role of religion in the life of the people, nor rejection of 
religious education as a means of fostering it. The claims of 
religion were not minimized by refusing to make the public schools 
agencies for their assertion. The non-sectarian or public school 
was the means of reconciling freedom in general with religious 
freedom. The sharp confinement of the public schools to secular 
education was a recognition of the need of a democratic society to 
educate its children, insofar as the State undertook to do so, in 
an atmosphere free from pressures in a realm where pressures are 
most resisted and where conflicts are most easily and most bitterly 
engendered. Designed to serve as a perhaps the most powerful 
agency for promoting cohesion among a heterogeneous democratic 
people, the public schools must keep scrupulously free from 
entanglement in the strife of sects. The preservation of the 
community from divisive conflicts, of Government from 
irreconcilable pressures by religious groups, of religion from 
censorship and coercion however subtly exercised, requires strict 
confinement of the State to instruction other than religious, 
leaving to the individual's church and home, indoctrination in the 
faith of his choice (333 U.S. 203, 216-17). 
Justice Frankfurter called attention to the Blaine Amendment and 
the requirement by Congress in 1876 that every state admitted to the 
union thereafter maintain school systems free of sectarian control. He 
then sketched the considerations that prompted efforts by religious 
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groups first to seek financial relief for their schools and eventually 
to request released time programs in public schools so that the schools 
would not monopolize the children's time. He noted that the first such 
program was started in Gary, Indiana in 1914. But he emphasized that 
the concept of released time was not at issue in this case, only the 
part played by public schools in executing a particular released time 
program. He held out a possible alternative by contrasting the 
Champaign progra~ with the French practice of "'dismissed time,' whereby 
one school day is shortened to allow all children to go where they 
please, leaving those who so desire to go to a religious school" (333 
u.s. 203, 230). 
Justice Jackson's concurring opinion shows that he was troubled by 
the potential constitutional damage that could be wrought by the Court's 
blanket assertion of the incorporation theory: 
I think it is doubtful whether the facts of this case establish 
juridiction in this Court, but in any event ... we should place 
some bounds on the demands for interference with local schools that 
we are empowered or willing to entertain (333 U. S. 203, 232). 
He warned that if the Court did not circumscribe its jurisdiction with 
care it could expect to be continually drawn into this kind of local 
controversy. He considered the relief demanded in this case to be 
extraordinary and observed that the representatives of any of the 256 
substantial religious bodies in the country had as good a right to 
demand relief: 
If we are to eliminate everything that is objectionable to any of 
these warring sects or inconsistent with any of their doctrines, we 
will leave public education in shreds. Nothing but educational 
confusion and a discrediting of the public school system can result 
from subjecting it to constant law suits (333 U.S. 203, 235). 
Justice Jackson further noted that "nearly everything in our 
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culture worth transmitting, everything which gives meaning to life, is 
saturated with religious influences ... " (333 U.S. 203, 236). Thus, 
although he agreed that formal and explicit religious instruction like 
that under the Champaign plan must be ended, he also believed that as a 
rule local authorities must be left enough flexibility to deal with 
local conditions. He concluded that the Court's reach was exceeding its 
grasp: 
" 
It is idle to pretend that this task is one for which we can find 
in the Constitution one word to help us as judges to decide where 
the secular ends and the sectarian begins in education. Nor can we 
find guidance in any other legal source. It is a matter on which 
we can find no law but our own prepossessions. If with no surer 
legal guidance we are to take up and decide every variation of this 
controversy, raised by persons not subject to penalty or tax but 
who are dissatisfied with the way schools are dealing with the 
problem, we are likely to have much business of the sort. And, 
more importantly, we are likely to make the legal "wall of 
separation between church and state" as winding as the famous 
serpentine wall designed by Mr. 1 ~efferson for the University he founded (333 U.S. 203, 237-38). 
Justice Reed, the lone dissenter, reflected similar suspicions: 
. . future cases must run the gantlet not only of the judgment 
entered but of the accompanying words of the opinions. I find it 
difficult to extract from the opinions any conclusion as to what it is 
in the Champaign plan that is unconstitutional" (333 U.S. 203, 240). 
Many critics of the decision were similarly perplexed, like the 
editorialist for the American Bar Association Journal, who found in the 
Scriptures the very genesis of freedom and--referring to the Soviet 
Constitution--remarked: "Nothing in our Constitution commands that 
' f 1 ' h 11 b f d f 1 . . " 1 3 freedom o re igion s a e ree om rom re lglon. 
But with the exception of the McCollum decision, the Court's 
rulings upheld the traditional accommodationist pattern in establishment 
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cases until the famous school prayer and Bible reading decisions of the 
early 1960s. In fact, the Court declined to accept jurisdiction in the 
first Bible reading case brought before it. Justice Jackson, writing 
for the majority in Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 429 (1952), 
found that the parents involved in the suit had not shown any direct 
financial interest or injury. Only Justices Douglas, Reed, and Burton 
dissented. 
Later that term, Justice Douglas temporarily left the separationist 
ranks to render an opinion upholding another variety of released time in 
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 306 (1952). Justice Douglas overlooked 
Justice Black's argument that public schoolchildren were a captive 
audience but repeated his remark that the Constitution does not support 
a philosophy of hostility to religion, then added: 
We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme 
Being. . . . When the state encourages religious instruction or 
cooperates with religious authorities by adjusting the schedule of 
public events to sectarian needs, it follows the best of our 
traditions. For it then respects the religious nature of our 
people and accommodates the public service to their spiritual 
needs. To hold that it may not would be to find in the 
Constitution a requirement that the government show a callous 
indifference to religious groups. That would be preferring those 
who believe in no religion over those who do believe (343 U. S. 
306f 313-14). 
But it is difficult to find a significant difference between this 
program and the one rejected in the McCollum case. It was not even a 
true form of dismissed time. But since it did not require the use of 
public school facilities, the law was easier to view favorably since it 
clearly excluded religious classes from the building. 
In his dissent, Justice Black reiterated his earlier position that 
the state was using its coercive power to benefit religious sects. He 
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The Incorporation Theory 
The Court's break with a longstanding tradition of civil religion 
stirred considerable controversy from many sides of the issue. In his 
essay, "The Court as a National School Board," Edward Corwin blasted the 
McCollum decision and the earlier Everson dissent by Justice Wiley 
Rutledge. He took particular exception to the Court's reading of 
history: "All in all, it is fairly evident that Justice Rutledge sold 
his brethren a bill of goods when he persuaded them that the 
"establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment was intended 
to rule out all governmental 'aid to all religions. r 16 Then, commenting 
on Justice Felix Frankfurter's supplemental opinion in the McCollum 
case, Corwin noted: "· .. the opinion is a well-documented sketch of 
the secularization of public school education in the United States a 
reform effected--so far as it has been effected--purely by the political 
process, unaided up to this point by the Supreme Court." 17 
Specifically, he was referring to Horace Mann's opposition to 
sectarianism, adding that Mann himself would have denied he was opposed 
to religious instruction in the schools. 18 
Much of the scholarly controversy centered around Justice Black's 
incorporation argument, which was most fully developed in his dissenting 
opinion in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1948). Corwin 
himself considered the incorporation theory defective, noting that the 
Court rejected it as late as 1922 in Prudential Insurance Co. v. Cheek, 
259 U.S. 530, 534), and addressed himself to the congressional debates 
over the Fourteenth Amendment as an illustration: 
That the Fourteenth Amendment would make the Bill of Rights 
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also raised the issue of "political divisiveness" with his comment that 
"State help to religion injects political and party prejudices into a 
holy field" (343 U.S. 306, 320). Replying directly to majority 
opinion, he emphasized that the separation of church and state is 
constitutionally mandated because Americans are a religious people. 
Justice Jackson's pithy reply was even more to the point: 
My evangelistic brethren confuse an objection to compulsion with an 
objection to religion. It is possible to hold a faith with enough 
confidence to believe that what should be rendered to God does not 
need to be decided and collected by Caesar. 
The day that this country ceases to be free for irreligion it will 
cease to be free for religion--except for the sect that can win 
political power (343 U.S. 306, 234-25). 
It might be added that the same coercive powers could be exercised 
on behalf of irreligion or some more attractively labeled equivalent. 
The complications Justice Jackson had foreseen were becoming inescapably 
evident. As he remarked at the end of his Zorach dissent: 
The wall which the Court was professing to erect between Church and 
State has become even more warped and twisted than I expected. 
Today's judgment will be more interesting to students of psychology 
and of the judicial processes than to students of constitutional 
law (343 U. S. 306, 325). 
Indeed, the frontiers between these fields of study have become so 
confounded that the Court's incorporation of sociological and 
14 psychological precepts into its decisions is now a commonplace. 
The McCollum decision stood as an admittedly important but lonely 
precedent until the Court again took up the issue of religion in public 
schools a decade later, when it banned classroom prayer, prohibited 
devotional Bible reading, and began formulating the establishment clause 
15 tests. But in the meantime, the Court extended its string of 
accommodationist rulings through a series of Sunday law cases. 
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applicable to the states was frequently asserted in the 
congressional debates on the former, but this circumstance lends 
little if any support to the holding in the McCollum case. For one 
thing, the Court can hardly rely on it and at the same time reject 
the conception of the "establishment of religion" clause which 
prevailed in 1868. If history is to be folt~wed on the one point, 
it cannot fairly be abandoned on the other. 
Corwin indicated that the repeated introduction of the Blaine 
Amendment down to 1929 "assumes, of course, that it was necessary in 
order to fill a gap in the Constitution. 1120 But he also believed that 
the Court had already set an appropriate precedent for handling free 
exercise issues in its Pierce decision, when Justice McReynolds was able 
to affirm the rights of parents and private schools without resorting to 
incorporation or even to the First Amendment. He concluded: "All in 
all, it seems clear that the Court, by its decision in the McCollum 
case, has itself promulgated a law prohibiting 'the free exercise' of 
religion, contrary to the express prohibition of the First Amendment. 21 
A year later, Charles Fairman attacked the incorporation theory in 
a lengthy analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment debates and concluded 
that, at the time, Senator Jacob Howard of Michigan was alone in 
contending that the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment incorporated the personal rights guarantees of the Bill of 
Rights. In essence, this was the position taken up by Justice Black's 
position. Fairman concluded that the historical record was 
h l . l . t h. 22 overw e mlng y agalns lm. 
Another critic, John Whitehead, believes that the author of the key 
section--section 1--of the Fourteenth Amendment contradicted himself on 
its meaning. Representative John Bingham, a Republican from Ohio, 
declared during a floor speech in 1871 that he had designed the proposal 
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so that it would initate the language used in Article I, section 10 to 
limit state powers. He then claimed that the amendment's effect was to 
incorporate the first eight amendments via the privileges and immunities 
23 
clause. But during the original debates in 1866, he made a very 
different pitch: 
I ask the attention of the House to the further consideration that 
the proposed amendment does not impose upon any State of the Union, 
or any citizen of any State of the Union, any obligation which is 
not now enjoi~4d upon them by the very letter of the 
Constitution. 
Then, a few months afterwards, he either modified or clarified his 
original position: 
Allow me, Mr. Speaker, in passing, to say that this amendment takes 
from no State any right that ever pertained to it. No State ever 
had the right, under the forms of law or otherwise, to deny to any 
freeman the equal protection of the laws or to abridge the 
privileges or immunities of any citizen of the Republic, although 
many of25hem have assumed and exercised the power, and that without 
remedy. 
This last remark may have been directed at the Court's decision in Dred 
Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393 (1857), which undoubtedly convinced many 
of the need for reform. In addition, the amendment was designed to 
enable the Civil Rights Act to be enforced. 
But even if Bingham's later conclusion is granted, his 
incorporation rationale apparently found little support at the time. 
Bernard Schwartz has commented that 
. . . if such was the intent of the draftsmen of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, it was soon to be frustrated. As Professor Corwin once 
put it, "Unique among the constitutional provisions, the privileges 
and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment enjoys the 
distinction of having been rendered a "practical nullity" by a 
single decision of the ~gpreme Court rendered within five years 
after its ratification. 
He was referring specifically to the Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36 
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(1873), which represented an early instance of judicial activism. 
More recently, Chester Antieau examined the records of the state 
ratification debates and concluded that the states fully appreciated 
that the amendment would greatly expand federal legislative and judicial 
27 
as well as reduce state powers. This was certainly a common fear 
among opponents. But whether the legislatures that ratified the 
amendment regarded its purpose and effect in this light is still 
problematic. 
A key consideration, however, has been largely overlooked in the 
academic debate over whether Bingham's earlier higher law view, his 
later incorporation theory, or some other interpretation should prevail. 
This is the complex legal issue over the manner in which Congress and 
the White House conducted themselves during this period. The 
impeachment of President Andrew Johnson and the excesses of the 
Reconstruction well covered by the standard histories. Largely 
forgotten, however, is the story of the political tactics by which the 
Fourteenth Amendment came to be ratified. 
The issue of coercion was raised by a leading constitutional 
scholar of the period, George Ticknor Curtis, who had earlier argued 
before the Supreme Court on behalf of Dred Scott. He noted that 
Secretary of State William Seward proclaimed ratification on July 20, 
1868 but cast doubt on its legality because the total vote included 
ratifications by six de facto state legislatures. By that time, Ohio 
and New Jersey had also withdrawn their ratification, as did Oregon a 
few months after Seward's announcement. Curtis surveyed the whole 
proceeding with evident displeasure and finally took an ambivalent view 
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as to its legality, observing only that 
... when such a process of amendment is resorted to, it must 
depend on future events whether an amendment, thus purporting to 
have been adopted, is to be regarded as having become valid under 
the principles of public law, which are deemed to cure 
irregularities in and de~§rtures from the legal and constitutional 
method of public action. 
Felix Morley later attributed the Military Reconstruction Act of 
1867 to a scheme by Thaddeus Stevens and his associates in Congress to 
circumvent the negative ratification votes by the Southern states: 
Although it was then almost two years since the complete collapse 
of the Confederacy, this Act defined its States as "rebel," 
declared that "no legal State government" existed in that area, 
placed these States under military rule, and added the blackmailing 
provision that this tyranny would continue until new and compliant 
legislatures "shall have adopted the Fourteenth Amendment." Only 
thereafter would any recalcitrant Southern State "be declared 
entitled to representation in Congress." 
President Johnson promptly vetoed this "Reconstruction Act" as 
completely and obviously unconstitutional and many suits against it 
were brought in the courts. But the Radicals overrode the veto, 
brought impeachment proceedings against the President "for high 
crimes and misdemeanors" and further threatened impeachment of the 
Supreme Court justices, who thereupon supinely bowed themselves out 
of the picture on the curious reasoning (Georgia v. Stanton) that 
the issues aroused by the Act were political and not justiciable. 
They surely were political. The clear objective of Stevens was to 
change the form of government into that of a parliamentary 
democracy with the President--Senator Ben Wade was tapped to 
succeed Johnson--wholly subordinate to a Congress in which the 
Radicals would be a permanently dominant party. But if that 
revolutionary design was not2~usticiable then there is no such thing as constitutional law. 
In view of this record, it is perhaps no cause for wonder that the 
Court tended to ignore some of the more radical implications of the 
amendment for many years afterwards. 
The Sunday Law Cases 
The cluster of Sunday law cases the Court decided on May 29, l96l 
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brought the separationist and accommodationist positions--along with 
free exercise and establishment clause expectations--to their first real 
test in nearly a decade. In four decisions that laid the groundwork for 
the curious compromises and sometimes unpredictable rulings that 
followed, the Court upheld Sunday closing laws as reasonable exercises 
of the police power to achieve secular goals. Chief Justice Earl Warren 
wrote the four opinions for the Court. Justice Douglas alone dissented 
in all the cases. 
The facts in three of the cases were similar. The appellants, who 
were owners or employees of stores in Maryland and Pennsylvania, were 
convicted of violating state laws prohibiting the sale of merchandise on 
Sunday. In McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961 ), Chief Justice 
Warren noted that, although the employees of a discount department store 
challenged the law as an establishment of religion, they did not allege 
that their free exercise rights had been violated. Instead, they 
claimed that they suffered direct economic injury "due to the imposition 
on them of the tenets of the Christian religion.'' In a review of the 
long history of Sunday closing laws in Europe and America, the Chief 
Justice noted that their justification had been gradually secularized 
and their connection with state religious establishments severed. He 
cited the previous Supreme Court cases and then noted that Virginia kept 
its statute banning Sunday labor even after passage of its law of 1799 
that established religious freedom. In fact, James Madison sponsored a 
bill punishing sabbath breakers which passed in 1785. 
Although he conceded that some of the evidence indicated a 
religious purpose, the Chief Justice believed that the law's secular 
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purpose of providing a common day of rest for all citizens had long been 
emphasized: 
After engaging in the close scrutiny demanded of us when First 
Amendment liberties are at issue, we accept the State Supreme 
Court's determination that the statutes' present purpose and effect 
is not to aid religion but to set aside a day of rest and 
recreation (366 U.S. 420, 449). 
He also contended that since the purpose of the law was not just to 
provide a day of rest, but a common day, no less burdensome alternative 
means were available to it. 
Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market, 366 U.S. 617 (1961 ), 
involved the owners and patrons of a kosher grocery store in 
Springfield, Massachusetts. The owners, who strictly observed the 
Jewish sabbath and dietary laws, kept the store closed from Friday 
evening until Sunday morning but then conducted one-third of their 
business for the week that day. They contended that the exceptions to 
the statute were so numerous and arbitrary that it lacked a rational 
basis and had convinced a federal district court to enjoin enforcement 
of the statute against them. They also claimed it violated their 
religious freedom. 
After reviewing the exceptions, the Chief Justice argued that 
simply "because the State wishes to protect those who do worship on 
Sunday does not mean that the State means to impose religious worship on 
all" (366 U.S. 617, 627). But he concluded that the particular 
exceptions indicated that ''the present scheme is one to provide an 
atmosphere of recreation rather than religion," then cited several cases 
that gave a religious character to the statute but did not indicate that 
its purpose was exclusively religious. 
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In Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 
(1961 ), the Court noted that the Pennsylvania legislators who backed the 
most recently updated version of the law "specifically disavowed any 
religious purpose for its enactment but stated instead that economics 
required its passage" ( 366 U.S. 582, 595) . 
The toughest of the four cases, Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 
(1961 ), admittedly involved an extreme financial hardship. The 
appellants, all of whom were Orthodox Jewish merchants in Philadephia, 
claimed that the Sunday closing law impaired their ability to earn a 
livelihood. One claimed he would be unable to stay in business, thereby 
losing his capital investment. But the Court upheld the statute and 
cited the belief-action dichtomy of the Cantwell rule. Arguing in much 
the way that Justice Frankfurter did in the McCollum case, Chief Justice 
Warren suggested that 
.. the Sunday law simply regulates a secular activity and, as 
applied to appellants, operates so as to make the practice of their 
religious beliefs more expensive. Furthermore, the law's effect 
does not inconvenience all members of the Orthodox Jewish faith but 
only those who believe it necessary to work on Sunday. And even 
these are not faced with as serious a choice as forsaking their 
religious practices or subjecting themselves to criminal 
prosecution (366 U.S. 599, 606). 
He also indicated that if the shoe were on the other foot, these 
merchants would enjoy a competitive advantage over those who observed 
Sunday as a day of rest. He concluded that this fact might lead some to 
claim religious exemptions on spurious grounds, necessitating a 
state-conducted inquiry into their sincerity that he believed would 
violate the spirit of the constitution. 
Justices Brennan and Stewart dissented in the Gallagher and 
Braunfeld cases but their opinions only concerned the latter. Justice 
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Brennan failed to see either a grave and immediate danger or a 
compelling state interest that would dictating enforcing an economic 
hardship on Orthodox Jewish merchants. He mentioned several states that 
permitted exceptions which covered this case and remarked that the 
difficulties the Court "conjures up ... seem to me more fanciful than 
real." Justice Stewart was more succinct: 
Pennsylvania has passed a law which compels an Orthodox Jew to 
choose between his religious faith and his economic survival. That 
is a cruel choice. It is a choice which I think no State can 
constitutionally demand. For me this is not something that can be 
swept under the rug and forgotten in the interest of enforced 
Sunday togetherness. I think the impact of this law upon these 
appellants grossly violates their constitutional right to the free 
exercise of religion (366 U.S. 599, 616). 
Justice Frankfurter, who was joined by Justice John Harlan, wrote a 
separate concurring opinion covering 100 pages, largely composed of a 
study of the history of Sunday laws. He noted that only Alaska lacked 
some variety of Sunday legislation and rejected the arguments, then 
rejected the various grounds given by the appellants with voluminous 
citations from statutory and case law. 
But Justice Douglas would have none of this. For him, the 
religious factor was decisive and he contended that the statutes were an 
unconstitutional establishment of religion. He did not confine his 
dissent to this issue, however, and strung together a series of 
observations, including some that were reminiscent of his Zorach 
opinion: "The institutions of our society are founded on the belief that 
there is an authority higher than the authority of the State; that there 
is a moral law which the state is powerless to alter; that the 
individual possesses rights, conferred by the Creator, which government 
must respect" (366 U.S. 420, 562). He lauded the Puritan contribution 
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to constitutional law but emphasized that the First Amendment was 
designed to prevent coercive measures by government and remarked that 
"if a religious leaven is to be worked into the affairs of our people, 
it is to be done by individuals and groups, not by the Government." 
Like the majority, he reviewed the history of Sunday legislation but 
based his dissent on the California Supreme Court's opinion in Ex parte 
Newman, 9 Cal. 502, 509 (1858): "'The truth is, however much it may be 
disguised, that this one day of rest is a purely religious idea'" (366 
U.S. 420, 570). He believed that the Court's rulings in these cases had 
the effect of bringing religious minorities "to heel because the 
minority, in the doing of acts which intrinsically wholesome and not 
antisocial, does not defer to the majority's religious beliefs" (366 
u.s. 420, 575). 
Justice Douglas repeated his views the following year when a 
criminal case, Arlan's Department Store v. Kentucky, 371 U.S. 218 
(1962), came to the Court on appeal and was dismissed for want of a 
substantial federal question. 
The significance of these cases is perhaps best appreciated in 
light of the school cases that both preceded and followed them. Even 
though the Court determined that these laws had the secular purpose of 
promoting a common day of rest, it did not blink at the long historical 
association of Sunday laws with established religion. It simply 
asserted--in so many words--that the practice had been secularized. But 
it did not address the question whether, in fact, an establishment of 
sorts remained and it failed to come to grips with Justice Douglas' 
observation that it favored a religious majority. The majority had 
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history on its side. The dissenters relied on the logic of the Court's 
earlier separationist rhetoric. 
What may not be so evident, however, is the consistency of these 
rulings with those in several of the school cases. The financial 
burdens placed on these merchants was probably not greater than those 
borne by private religious schools and the families whose children 
attend them. Justices Jackson and Rutledge had earlier addressed this 
problem but failed to resolve it. Indeed, the Court has tended to 
overlook such simple economic arithmetic in its calculus of First 
Amendment requirements. Even so, when it overruled Nebraska and Oregon 
in the early private school cases, it was armed only with the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Perhaps the difference is 
that the Court was not sidetracked then by "a clash of views as to what 
the wall separates" and stuck to fundamentals, such as the rights to 
personal liberty and property. 
The remnants of state religion were proving more intractable than 
the metaphor of a high and impregnable wall would indicate. It wa:s not 
only a "warped and twisted" wall but, as Roger Williams had recognized, 
a broken one. Yet even the strictest separationists were unwilling to 
say that there could be no commerce over, under, or through the wall. 
It may be that, as Robert Frost said so simply, there is something that 
does not like a wall. Perhaps, indeed, "all law is an establishment of 
religion" in the extended and possibly more practical sense the Court 
has been compelled to adopt in light of its separationist logic. The 
nature of that establishment remains, as usual, one of the major bones 
of political contention. 
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Devotional Exercises 
The controversy over the McCollum decision was, if anything, 
exceeded by the public debate over back-to-back rulings that first of 
all banned group prayers in public school classrooms and then devotional 
Bible reading. Although many states had by then prohibited such obvious 
religious expressions, others considered them vital to maintaining a 
proper atmosphere for learning. Following these rulings, education 
became the major battleground over competing judicial and religious 
philosophies. It has remained so ever since, as may be surmised by the 
fact that prayer in public schools is still a political and judicial 
issue in 1984. 30 
For the third time, Justice Black wrote for the Court in a key 
establishment case. In Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), the Court 
ruled that a prayer recommended by the New York Board of Regents--or any 
prayer--may not be recited as a daily classroom exercise. The parents 
of ten pupils unsuccessfully challenged the practice in the state courts 
and had been granted certiorari by the Supreme Court. 
The famous Regents' Prayer, like many of its counterparts used 
across the country, was short, simple, and considered nonsectarian: 
"'Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy 
blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our Country'" (370 U.S. 
421, 422). It was clearly theistic but not identifiable with any of the 
several religions that claim the Bible as their source. Justice Black, 
however, characterized it as a violation of the establishment clause 
"because that prayer was composed by governmental officials as a part of 
a program to further religious beliefs." He then turned to the history 
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of officially-sponsored prayers, especially the controversy aroused by 
the Book of Common Prayer used in the established, tax-supported Church 
of England: "It is a matter of history that this very practice of 
establishing governmentally composed prayers for religious services was 
one of the reasons which caused many of our early colonists to leave 
England and seek religious freedom in America11 (370 U.S. 421, 425). 
It was for the sake of such matters of personal and corporate 
conscience that the founders were led to seek constitutional guarantees 
that would not be influenced by the ballot box. Justice Black concluded 
that the purposes behind the establishment clause went far beyond those 
of the free exercise clause: 
Although these two clauses may in certain instances overlap, they 
forbid two quite different kinds of governmental encroachment upon 
religious freedom. The Establishment Clause, unlike the Free 
Exercise Clause, does not depend upon any showing of direct 
governmental compulsion and is violated by the enactment of laws 
which establish an official religion whether those laws operate 
directly to coerce nonobserving individuals or not. . . . Its first 
and most immediate purpose rested on the belief that a union of 
government and religion tends to destroy government and to degrade 
religion. The history of governmentally established religion, both 
in England and in this country, showed that whenever government had 
allied itself with one particular form of religion, the inevitable 
result had been that it had incurred the hatred, disrespect and 
even contempt of those who held contrary beliefs. That same 
history showed that many people had lost their respect for any 
religion that had relied upon the support of government to spread 
its faith. The Establishment Clause thus stands as an expression 
of principle on the part of the Founders of our Constitution that 
religion is too personal, too sacred, too holy, to permit its 
'unhallowed perversion' by a civil magistrate. Another purpose of 
the Establishment Clause rested upon an awareness of the historical 
fact that governmentally established religions and religious 
persecutions go hand in hand (370 U.S. 430, 431-32). 
In light of history, however, it is clear that many of the American 
founders would not have granted that the office of the civil magistrate 
must somehow be detached from all religious duties to preserve its 
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secular character. One of the distinctive ideas of the Protestant 
reformers was the "priesthood of all believers," in which even civil 
offices were treated as religious callings. If it is true, as Orestes 
Brownson asserted in the nineteenth century, that in the long run this 
doctrine was creating a general disregard for all authority--a point 
that may be argued--it is not evident that the founders were any less 
committed to their religious profession than those who sought to retain 
a legal and financial ties between church and state. But Justice Black 
correctly identified the compulsory and corrupting nature of this tie as 
the problem the founders attempted to resolve by constitutional means. 
He reaffirmed the Court's position that its separationist position did 
not indicate any hostility to religion: 
Nothing, of course, could be more wrong. The history of man is 
inseparable from the history of religion. And perhaps it is not 
too much to say that since the beginning of that history many 
people have devoutly believed that "More things are wrought by 
prayer than this world dreams of" (370 U.S. 421, 434). 
Justice Douglas concurred but hinted that the Court was 
inconsistent in not similarly challenging the chaplaincy. He believed 
that every audience, whether adults in Congress or children in the 
public schools, is a captive audience. Once again, he appealed to logic 
while the Court appealed to history and contended that the Everson 
decision, which he had supported, was "out of line with the First 
Amendment." 
Only Justice Stewart dissented. He emphasized the voluntary aspect 
of the prayer and did not equate this issue with the establishment of a 
state church. He was concern about the logical implications of the 
ruling, believing it called into question such familiar expressions of 
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civil religion as the national anthem, the pledge of allegiance, and the 
inscription of "In God We Trust" on coins. 
The Court let the other shoe fall the next year when it banned 
devotional Bible reading from public school classrooms in School 
District of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). Much of the 
controversy focused on its companion case, Murray v. Curlett, which 
involved Madalyn Murray--who subsequently became the most highly 
publicized atheist since Colonel Robert Ingersoll--and her argument that 
the practice placed a premium on belief as opposed to unbelief. The 
members of the Schempp family, who were Unitarians, objected to 
"specific religious doctrines purveyed by a literal reading of the Bible 
'which were contrary to the religious beliefs which they held and to 
their familial teaching'" (374 U.S. 203, 208). The unacknowledged issue 
in this case was the view that "Christianity is part of the common law 
of Pennsylvania," which had been reiterated by the courts in a number of 
cases up until that time. The defense called as an expert witness Dr. 
Luther Weigle, who contended that the Bible is nonsectarian. 
After reviewing the particulars, Justice Clark noted the close 
identification of religion with American history and government, but 
then added that religious freedom is just as "strongly imbeded in our 
public and private life." The heart of his opinion was his concept that 
government must maintain strict neutrality with respect to religion in 
order to prevent "a fusion of governmental and religious functions or a 
concert or dependency of one upon the other ... " (374 U.S. 203, 222). 
Justice Douglas concurred and mentioned the use of compulsory religious 
exercises in "state-church countries" like Spain. He emphasized that 
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the most effective way to establish a religion is to finance its 
schools. 
Justice Brennan wrote a concurring opinion that rivaled in length 
the opinion by Justice Frankfurter in the Sunday law cases, most of 
which was devoted to an analysis of the constitutional and judicial 
history of the religion clauses, followed by a review of the history of 
public education. He took up a problem that had earlier been addressed 
by Justice Jackson: 
The fact is that the line which separates the secular from the 
sectarian in American life is elusive. The difficulty of defining 
the boundary with precision inheres in a paradox central to our 
scheme of liberty. While our institutions reflect a firm 
conviction that we are a religious people, those institutions by 
solemn constitutional injunction may not officially involve 
religion in such a way as to prefer, discriminate against, or 
oppress, a particular sect or religion. Equally the Constitution 
enjoins those involvements of religious with secular institutions 
which (a) serve the essentially religious activities of religious 
institutions; (b) employ the organs of government for essentially 
religious purposes; or (c) use essentially religious means to serve 
governmental ends where secular means would suffice (374 U.S. 203, 
231). 
He rejected arguments that daily prayer and Bible reading were 
justified because they served a secular purpose. He did not question 
their positive value but concluded that "the State acts 
unconstitutionally if it either sets about to attain even indirectly 
religious ends by religious means, or if it uses religious means to 
serve secular ends where secular means would suffice" (374 U.S. 203, 
281 ). He further stated there "are persons in every co!limunity--often 
deeply devout--to whom any version of the Judaeo-Christian Bible is 
offensive" and he contrasted various sectarian attitudes toward public 
prayers. But even if students were excused from these exercises, he 
considered the fact that they were religious "altogether dispositive." 
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At last, he turned to several additional questions on the basis of 
a standard of neutrality, defending the employment of military and 
prison chaplains, religious exercises in legislative bodies, 
non-devotional uses of the Bible, uniform tax exemptions that 
incidentally benefit religious organizations, religious considerations 
in such public welfare programs as unemployment compensation, and 
activities he believed had lost their religious significance. He 
mentioned, for example, that "it would be impossible to teach 
meaningfully many subjects in the social sciences or humanities without 
some mention of religion" (374 U.S. 203, 300). 31 
Justice Stewart again was the lone dissenter and stated that he 
considered the measures as being designed to make possible the free 
exercise of religion. He compared the practice to the provision of 
military chaplains for soldiers stationed at faraway outposts. The 
issue, he believed, turned on the question of coercion, allegations of 
which were absent from the record. 
A particular doctrinal tenet became the central issue five years 
later in Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968), when the Court voided 
a statute that made it unlawful to "'teach the theory or doctrine that 
mankind descended from a lower order of animals"' in any state-supported 
school. Justice Abe Fortas, who spoke for the Court, declined to 
overrule the law on the vaguenes issue that had been raised and instead 
that it must be stricken because, he believed, the sole reason for the 
law was to proscribe a particular segment of the body of knowledge 
"deemed to conflict with a particular religious doctrine; that is, with 
a particular interpretation of the Book of Genesis by a particular 
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group" (393 U.S. 97, 103). 
Justice Black, who concurred with the ruling, said he was "by no 
means sure that this case presents a genuinely justiciable case or 
controversy." He pointed out that the law had nslumbered on the books 
as though deadn for nearly forty years. What particularly troubled him 
was the way the Court chose to intrude ninto state powers to decide what 
subjects and schoolbooks it may wish to use in teaching state pupilsn 
(393 U.S. 97, 111 ). He believed that the state's motive was probably 
simply to remove a controversial subject from its schools and saw no 
reason vJhy it may not do so. Regarding this subject, he added: "If the 
theory is considered anti-religious, as the Court indicates, how can the 
State be bound by the Federal Constitution to permit its teachers to 
advocate such an 'anti-religious' doctrine to schoolchildren'" (393 U.S. 
97, 113)? Justices Harlan and Stewart also wrote separate concurring 
opinions. 
The issue raised by Justice Black points up one of the dilemmas 
involved in the Court's strict separationist position on the 
establishment clause. The conclusion that public schools cannot be 
permitted to teach doctrines that offend particular religious beliefs is 
simply the other side of the coin that does not permit the state to 
establish a religious doctrine. The establishment implications are 
inescapable. 
The issue has by no means disappeared. An altogether different 
tack has been taken more recently that would require equal time for 
creationist and evolution theories about human origins. This approach 
would altogether fail to meet Justice Black's separationist standard but 
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it does seem to reflect the logic by which the Court has chosen to 
balance competing separationist and accommodationist considerations. 
The consequences may be readily seen in the doctrinal inconsistencies 
32 that have led to contradictory results in the lower courts. Such are 
the dilemmas into which the judiciary has fallen in an attempt to 
reconcile what are seen as competing First Amendment values within the 
framework of an established public education system. 
Tension Between the Clauses 
Many commentators, including members of the Court, have expressed 
regret over the years at what they perceive as a tension between the 
religion clauses. Part of this tension may be due to the clash of 
competing doctrinal assumptions. Philip Kurland has favored Justice 
Frankfurter's view that the two religion clauses of the First Amendment 
. bl 33 are lnsepara e. Similarly, Justice Rutledge maintained that both 
clauses were linked by their common reference to religion. Others, 
however, have treated the clauses as if they make distinct, even 
unrelated, demands. 
But part of the tension may be due to the nature of the legal 
structure and the competing economic, educational, and social goals that 
are pursued by legislative and bureaucratic means. The courts have been 
increasingly called upon to harmonize conflicts over the distribution of 
governmental largesse, the pursuit of educational quality, and the 
regulation of social behavior. The coincidence of so many rulings with 
identifiable political and ideological positions is so evident that it 
brings to mind Justice Jackson's remark that "we can find no law but our 
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prepossessions. 11 
The most comprehensive judicial treatment of this alleged tension 
may be found in the dissenting opinion written by Justice William 
Rehnquist in Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security 
Division, 450 U.S. 707 (1981 ). He attributed this tension to three 
causes: 
First, the growth of social welfare legislation during the latter 
part of the 20th century has greatly magnified the potential for 
conflict between the two Clauses, since such legislation touches 
the individual at so many points in his life. Second, the decision 
by this Court that the First Amendment was 11 incorporated 11 into the 
Fourteenth Amendment and thereby made applicable against the States 
... similarly multiplied the number of instances in which this 
''tension11 might arise. The third, and perhaps most important, 
cause of the tension is our overly expansive interpretation of both 
Clauses. By broadly construing both Clauses, the Court has ----
constantly narrowed the channel between the Scylla and Charybdis 
through which any state or federal action must pass in order to 
survive constitutional scrutiny (450 U.S. 707, 721). 
He contended that those who framed and adopted the First Amendment could 
not have foreseen such applications of the religion clauses 11 at a time · 
when the Federal Government was in a real sense considered a government 
of limited delegated powers. 11 
If anything, the divisions within the Court have been intensified 
during the last decade. Unanimous decisions on religious issues are 
virtually a thing of the past. Shifting alliances have led to 
conflicting decisions that could more easily be attributed to a throw of 
the dice than to the operation of a particular set of doctrinal 
standards. Outcomes have sometimes turned on the interpretation of a 
single word in a statue or lower court dictum. Perhaps most 
characteristic of all have been the cases involving private school aid, 
which yielded such variant results in the course of a decade as to lead 
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an exasperated Justice John Paul Stevens to conclude they had been 
decided on an ad hoc basis. Amidst a tangled web of doctrine, the 
Court's role as an advocate appears to be taking an inward turn as the 
justices seek to find a ground upon which they might stand together. 
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